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Information technologies are inherently democratic. They force
decentralization and individualism. They are designed for
expansion, for interconnection, for networking. They have no
respect for barriers or roadblocks or... boundaries.'
INTRODUCTION
Today, telecommunications network technology augmented by
computers, telephones and fax machines, has increased the
capability of network owners, information providers and users to
manipulate and control the information transported over the
1. William G. McGowan, Remarks to the Society of Telecommunications
Consultants (May 19, 1990), at 9. (McGowan is the former Chairman and CEO
of MCI Communications Corp.) (source on file with author).
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networks.2 This increase in manipulation and control enhances
opportunities to engage in electronic speech, assembly and
associational activities for the purposes of creating and sharing
information.3 The types of information that can be generated and
shared on these networks can be personal, political, scientific,
religious, artistic, commercial, philosophical or illicit.
Further enhancements to access and speech opportunities may
result from two current network transitions. The first is the
transition from current media distribution networks of cable and
telephony to multi-media interactive networks. The second
involves the transition from such current media distribution
networks to programmable advanced intelligent networks. These
transitions have the potential to affect the control of access and
2. As used in this article, "network owner" means a firm having legal and
physical ownership of the transmission network(s) over which information is
carried. "Information provider" means a firm or individual which does not have
any ownership of the network over which its information service or program
flows. The information may take any of several forms including video, voice,
print or data. "User" or "end user" means an individual or group that subscribes
to the network to receive or to communicate information. Like the information
providers, users have no ownership of the network.
3. Subscribers to "augmented telecommunications networks" have the ability
to associate or assemble by voice and/or video in conference calls, via electronic
mail and computer bulletin boards. By using 800 and 900 numbers, information
providers can share information with hundreds of others interested in particular
subject matters. Such information providers act as "broadcasters" in that they
provide opportunities for information to travel widely to interested receivers.
In the near future, customer subscribers may be able to reconfigure network
components allowing the subscriber to create customized services for the creation,
transmission and sharing of information. For instance, as greater amounts of
intelligence are migrated from central office switches to other locations in public
and private networks, the opportunities for user creation, manipulation, dissemina-
tion and sharing of information increase. As a result, federal policies regulating
the distribution of intelligence in advanced intelligent networks merit serious
attention. These policies determine, in part, the specifications and standards for
the equipment in which the intelligence will be housed; who may manufacture,
own or have access to the equipment; and the manner in which the equipment
may be incorporated into existing and future networks. In the process of making
the above determinations, those who create the policies will determine how, to
what extent, and for what purpose network user/subscribers will acquire technical
access to the network. See Allen S. Hammond, Private Networks, Public Speech:
Constitutional Dimensions of Access to Private Networks, 55 U. PrrT. L. REv.
1085 (1994) [hereinafter Private Networks].
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speech at the network function, network transmission and informa-
tion content levels.
Multi-media convergence involves the transition from technolog-
ically separate, often mono-functional, one-way broadcast, cable
and telephone transmission networks for video, voice, and data
information, into broadband," multi-media, multi-functional,
interactive networks. As presently configured, only telecommuni-
cations (telephony and data networks) allow two-way interactive
communication, including equal capacity in both directions, on the
same network. The convergence of network technologies,
functions and information streams holds the promise of fully
interactive, multi-media communication for American society.
Moreover, it does so at a time when effective interpersonal and
intergroup communications are becoming increasingly electronic.
In addition to interactive voice, data and print communication,
Americans will be able to engage in video and multi-media
communication.
The transition to programmable advanced intelligent networks
involves increased use of software intelligence housed in a variety
of machines dispersed throughout a telecommunications network.
This determines how information may be manipulated on the
network. The machines and the software intelligence may
potentially be owned by network owners and network users.
4. Broadband networks have a wider bandwidth than voice-grade telcom-
munications channels. See Data Communications Glossary, DATA COMM., Mar.
1988, at 229.
5. For example, interactive communication on cable networks consists of
"pay-per-view" services which rely on two separate networks, telephony and
cable, to accomplish two-way communication. However, the downstream capacity
of the cable channel is far in excess of the upstream capacity of a digital
telephone line. Otherwise, cable channels are one-way down stream modes of
communication. Broadcast channels, whether radio or television, possess the same
one-way downstream capability of cable channels. See Gibbons Burke & David
Nusbaum, Cruising the Info Superhighway, FuTuREs: MAG. OF COMMODrriEs &
OPTIONs, June 1994, at 48. To the extent broadcast channels may be used for
two-way interactive communications, another network, telephony, is required. Id.
6. Policies addressing the evolution of intelligent networks seek to assure
enhanced service providers and users network access and interconnection which
is technically and financially equivalent to that which the network owner/provider
enjoys. See Dawn Bushaus, Enhanced Services-ONA and AIN on Collision
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Furthermore, the transition to advanced intelligent networks
ultimately holds the promise of user control, as well as network
owner control of the networks over which information flows.
Users will be able to program these networks to create commu-
nications using variables including, but not limited to: the intended
recipients, locations, transmission paths, speeds, type of information
and time of day.
The convergence transition concerns the type of media (e.g.,
voice, data, print or video) and complexity of information (single
or multi-media) network owners and users may communicate to
others on the network as configured and provided by the network
owner (i.e., it depends upon the capabilities of the network as
configured by the owner). On the other hand, the network
intelligence transition concerns how the network may be reconfig-
ured or programmed by the network owner or the network user to
manipulate and move information; it provides the flexibility to
change the configurations upon which the convergence transition
depends.
Collectively, multi-media programmable networks could usher
in a new era of electronic speech communication in the United
States. As proponents of recent legislation acknowledged: "[a]
broadband communications infrastructure will be every American's
tool of personal emancipation; will generate a quantum increase in
Americans' freedom of speech ... and freedom of ideas; will
allow Americans to recapture, yet expand upon, the democratic
tradition and community spirit of the early years of this nation."7
Course, CoMM. WK., June 17, 1991, at 32L. Presently, the Bell Operating
Companies are operating under Open Network Architecture (ONA) guidelines
established by the Federal Communications Commission in the 1980's. Id. ONA
was intended to give enhanced service providers, such as voice messaging
services, as well as on-line data services such as Prodigy and Compuserve, fair
and equal access to the local exchange portion of the public switched network for
provisioning their services. Ia&
7. Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act
of 1991, S. 1200, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(14) (1992). See Telecommunica-
tions Infrastructure Act of 1993, S. 1086, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(20) (1993)
(finding that "access to switched, digital telecommunications service for all
segments of the population promotes the core First Amendment goal of diverse
information sources by enabling individuals and organizations alike to publish and
19951
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Though previous and current legislative efforts have attempted
to regulate these evolving technologies,' exactly who will be the
recipients of this wealth of communicative power remains uncer-
tain. The question of who will benefit from the development of
networks with interactive, multi-media and programmable capabili-
ties is subject to intense debate among industry, the general public,
the courts, as well as previous and current congresses and presiden-
tial administrations. 9 Most recently, the debate has been fueled by
developments including the increase of proposed mergers of
telephone, cable and video programming firms.1" The legal debate
has also included industry-initiated constitutional challenges to
video and information market entry restrictions on local telephone
firms," unaffiliated party access requirements imposed on cable
otherwise make information available in electronic form.").
8. See infra part II.
9. See S. 1086, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 2(7) (1994); The United States Advisory Council on the National Information
Infrastructure, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,772 (1993); John Latta, Birth of Interactive TV,
MULTIMEDIA & VIDEODISC MONITOR, Jan. 1995; David Rohde, Sprint Alliances
May Come Tumbling Down, NETWORK WORLD, Nov. 12, 1994, at 31; Eric Krapf,
The Interactive Future - Take Two, AMERICA'S NETWORK, Nov. 15, 1994, at 38;
Debra Aho Williamson, Privacy is a Very Public Issue: A Key Benefit of New
Media May Become a Substantial Obstacle, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 17, 1994, at
14; Robert L. Fike, Analog or Digital: The Debate Continues, Transport
Facilities, TELEPHONY, Oct. 17, 1994, at 35; Information Superhighwway: Issues
Affecting Development, GAO REP., Sept. 30, 1994; Multimedia: The Revolution
is Underway, SEYBOLD REP. ON PuB. Sys., May 10, 1994, at S5.
10. See Sandra Sugawara & Paul Farhi, Merger to Create a Media Giant,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1993, at Al, A8; The Tangled Webs They Weave,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 1993, at 21-22.
11. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D.
Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994). While the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision which applied intermediate scrutiny to determine the
constitutionality of § 533(b) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended by the 1992 Cable Act
in multiple sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1984 Cable Act], it did not adopt
the lower court's reasoning. The district court concluded that the statute regulated
the speech of telephone companies based upon the content of the proscribed
speech. Because the statute required that the government determine whether video
programming akin to that provided by broadcast stations was being provided by
the telephone company, the lower court reasoned that the statute required
reference to the content of the video message conveyed. 830 F. Supp. at 923.
The Court of Appeals disagreed; citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984),
HeinOnline  -- 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 6 1995
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firms 2 and challenges to congressional and administrative agency-
authored restrictions on the transmission of indecent information
over telecommunications and cable networks." Government
it concluded that the statute's reference to broadcast television distinguished
speech based on whether it was or was not video programming, rather than on the
content communicated via the programming. 42 F.3d at 193-95.
One other circuit court and other district courts have also found the cable-
telephone cross-ownership ban unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. See
US West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994), affd, No.
94-35775, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 39121 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1995); Ameritech
Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); BellSouth Corp. v.
United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
12. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993),
vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). For press analysis of the Supreme Court's
Turner decision, see Doug Halonen, Cable, Broadcast Weigh Must-Carry Ruling,
ELEC. MEAm, July 4, 1994, at 3; Ana Puga, Congress Upheld on Cable Rule: But
Court Orders Review of 1st Amendment Issues, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 1994,
at 35; More Evidence Needed: U.S. Supreme Court Vacates Must-Carry Decision,
Remands It to Lower Court, COMM. DAILY, June 28, 1994, at 1; John Lippman,
For Now, TV Viewers Are Spared Another Juggling of the Channels; Cable: A
Final High Court Ruling on the 'Must-Carry' Statute Could be Years Away, L.A.
TIMES, June 28, 1994, at D5; David G. Savage, High Court OKs Congress' Right
to Regulate Cable TV, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1994, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, The
Media Business: Justices Back Cable Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1994, at
Dl; Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Connects Cable TV to Free Speech Protections
of Press, WASH. POST, June 28, 1994, at Al. For a synopsis of many of the key
holdings of the Turner case, see First Amendment-Communications, N.J.L.J., July
4, 1994, at 76.
13. At least two circuit courts have heard challenges to telephone company
decisions to deny transmission of indecent communications. See Dial Info. Servs.
Corp. of N.Y. v. Thornburg, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991); Carlin Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1987);
Infomiation Providers Coalition for the Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC,
928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled on a
challenge to federal legislation authorizing cable operators to deny carriage of
indecent programming on their leased and public access channels. See Alliance
for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In response to a
request for rehearing by the FCC and the Department of Justice, the court recently
granted an en banc rehearing of the Alliance case.
See also In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 998 (1993)(first report and order). For
commentary and limited analysis of Section 10, see Timothy B. Dyk & Sarah L.
Wanner, Developments in Communications Law: The FCC's Indecency Proposals
Under Fire, LEGAL TIMES, May 17, 1993, at 25; Bruce Fein, Cable Discretion
and the First Amendment, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at GI (arguing that the
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efforts to revise the communications regulatory structure through
legislation in an effort to stimulate rapid development of the
"National Information Infrastructure" have also been controver-
sial. 4
A central question in the debate concerns the control of access
to the merging telecommunications and cable television networks
and the flow of information. In other words, who will have access
to these networks and what limitations will be imposed?
Privately-owned networks allow for the distribution of informa-
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 properly
permits cable operators to eschew carriage on access channels of programming the
operators deem to be obscene or sexually explicit).
14. Recently, the Republican-controlled Senate issued its first proposed
legislation addressing the rewrite of the Communications Act of 1934. See
Discussion Draft of Telecommunications Bill Released February 1 by Sen. Larry
Pressler, DAILY REP. FOR EXEcIurvEs, Feb. 2, 1995, at M22. In the last session
of Congress, the House and Senate unsucessfully tried to pass major legislation.
See S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); The Antitrust and Communications
Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). See also Edmund
L. Andrews, Bill to Revamp Communications Dies in Congress, N.Y. TIrMs, Sept.
24, 1994, at 1; Elizabeth Corcoran, Telecommunications Reform Effort Haults;
Chiding Baby Bells, Senator Pulls Plug on Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1994, at
Dl; Senate Drops Telecom Reform, CHI. SUN. TInES, Sept. 23, 1994, (financial)
at 4; Telecommunications Reform Dies in the Senate, P.R. NawswiiR, Sept. 23,
1994; Rex Nutting, Communications Bill Dies, U.P.I., Sept. 23, 1994; Joanne
Kelly, Congress Won't Overhaul Telecom Law This Year, REUTERS WORLD
SERv., Sept. 23, 1994; Carolyn Lochhead, Demos Pull Plug On Information
Highway Bill, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1994, at Al; Leslie Helm, Bill To Overhaul
Phone Industry Dies in Senate, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1994, at Al; Phone, TV
Reform Dies, Time Runs Out On Update of Communications Law, CH[. TRIB.,
Sept. 24, 1994, (business) at 1. For an analysis of the controversy surrounding
FCC regulation of the cable industry, see Indecency Rules 'Unworkable',
TELEVISION DIG., Dec. 14, 1993, at 9; Cable Indecency Rules Called Unconstitu-
tional, 'Unworkable', COMM. DAILY, Dec. 9, 1992, at 4; In re Impletation of
Section of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 8
F.C.C.R. 998 (1993) (first report and order). The Clinton Administration has also
issued a report on its vision of the "electronic superhighway." The United States
Advisory Council on the National Information Infrastructure, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,772
(1993). For press analysis, see generally, Vice President Gore Press Conference
on Info Highways (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 21, 1993); Ronald Brown,
Secretary Brown on Three Goals for Our New National Information Infrastructure
- Telecommunications Policy Briefing, ROLL CALL, Nov. 15, 1993; Brooks Boliek,
U.S. Data Superhighway Project Short on Concrete: But Gore Vows Action on
New Infrastructure, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 16, 1993.
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tion generated by owners and information providers or users. The
owners of local telephone and cable television networks have the
ability to exercise bottleneck control over the flow of information
to and from their information providers and users. In addition,
because they are private, they arguably possess the constitutional
right to generate, select and edit information transmitted over their
networks. Consequently, just how the potential for private
censorship will be balanced against the potential for governmental
censorship in pursuit of expanded electronic speech for American
society becomes an important issue.
Many industry observers, regulators and scholars anticipate the
metamorphosis of telephone and cable television network firms into
broadband, interactive, multi-media networks. 5 As the distribu-
tion functions and information streams of cable and telephony
merge, the issue of electronic speech conducted by network
owners, information providers and users, which receive varying
degrees of constitutional protection when conducted over the ante-
cedent technologies, will shift to the merged networks. Moreover,
as these networks become programmable, user capabilities to
program the network will increase. As a result, the meaning of
private ownership and control over access and speech via network
technology and configuration may change.
15. See Jube Shiver, Jr. & Carla Lazzareshi, Regulations Slow to Catch Up
With New Technology, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1993, at Dl; James Gleick, The
Telephone Transformed - Into Almost Everything, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1993, at
26; Michael Arndt, Technological Torrent Shorts FCC Circuitry, Cm. TIB., June
19, 1994, at 1; Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Ready to Ease Its Legal Barriers in
Communications, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 1993, at Al; Peter Passell, A Satisfactory
Marriage; Many Economists See Boon to Competition in Merger of Cable and
Phone Companies, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1993, at Dl.
Some of the strategic market and technical reasons for the merger of telphone
and cable networks are explained in, S. Ronald Poster, CATV Systems are
Evolving to Support A Wide Range of Services; Delivering Voice and Other
Services Over Cable Television Systems, TELECOMM., Jan. 1994, at 95; Dave
Schriftgiesser, Key Trends in Broadband Communications: the Next Five Years;
Nobody is waiting for Alternatives to Asynchronous Transfer Mode, TELEcoMM.,
Jan. 1994, at 101; Rick Pinkham, Combining Apples and Oranges; part 1,
Telecommunications, and CATV Companies Merge to Form Full Service Hybrid
Networks, TELEPHONY, Jan. 24, 1994, at 32; Alan Stewart, Classless Cables;
Common Networks for Televisions and Telephones, COMM. INT'L., Oct. 1993, at
8.
19951
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Some preliminary guidance regarding the exercise of electronic
speech rights on future broadband interactive networks may be
gleaned from the judicial resolution of current challenges to
government-apportioned access and speech rights on local cable
television and telephone networks. 16  These challenges address
network owner control over access to the networks and regulation
of the content of protected speech, such as indecency.17 As such,
they address two of the three levels at which access and speech
may be controlled: owner control over access and regulation of
speech. The third level is the ability to program the network and
thereby determine what speech may be transmitted by virtue of
what the network makes possible. This level of control has been
addressed in FCC administrative proceedings concerning advanced
intelligent networks 8 and recent congressional attempts to revise
the Communications Act of 1934.19
In recent challenges to the telephone-cable television cross-
ownership prohibition of the 1984 Cable Act2" and the "must
carry" provisions of the 1992 Cable Act,2' the courts have begun
to address access and speech rights enjoyed by telephone and cable
television network owners.22 The courts have also begun to
determine the extent to which government may limit the ability of
16. See discussion infra parts III.B.2, III.C-II.D. Local telephone network
owners have lodged challenges against government efforts to preclude them from
engaging in video communications in their local service areas. See Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), affid, 42
F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994). Local cable television operators have challenged the
government's attempts to mandate non-affiliated programmer access to cable
networks. See Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1993). Additionally, network information providers and users have levied
constitutional challenges against government efforts to facilitate or sanction
network owner control of indecent speech on telephone and cable networks. See
Dial Info. Servs., 938 F.2d 1535; Carlin Communications, 827 F.2d 1291;
Information Providers, 928 F.2d 866; Alliance for Community Media, 10 F.3d
812.
17. See supra note 13.
18. See In re Intelligent Networks, 6 F.C.C.R. 7256 (1991) (notice of inquiry).
19. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
21. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.
1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
22. See discussion infra parts III.B.2, ImI.C-m.D.
HeinOnline  -- 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 10 1995
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future network owners to be information providers and the control
such owners may exercise over the access and speech of actual and
potential users of the network. 3 In light of current litigation,
telecommunications network owners may be granted speech rights
commensurate with those of cable operators at a time when cable
operators' speech rights have been expanded to preclude govern-
ment-mandated access by certain non-affiliated users. Consequent-
ly, the scope of user access, speech opportunities and speech rights
could shrink substantially.
Recent court decisions addressing challenges to government
regulation of indecent programming via telephony or cable
television may presage a revision of access and speech rights
afforded network owners and subscribers. Telephone common
carriers are increasingly viewed by the courts as private speakers
with the corresponding right to refuse carriage or bill services to
information providers seeking carriage of indecent programming
that the carrier deems undesirable.'
23. See discussion infra parts Il.B.2, III.C-IEI.D.
24. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Dial Info. Servs. Corp. of N.Y. v. Thornburg, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir.
1991); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d
1291 (9th Cir. 1987); Information Providers Coalition for the Defense of the First
Amendment, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
In each of the appellate cases, the issues concerned messages for which the
telephone companies collected fees on behalf of the information provider. The
information providers were allowed to provide messages for which the telephone
companies did not provide billing services. However, the difficulties associated
with collections absent the assistance of the phone companies rendered the
information providers' businesses marginal at best. The carriers' provision of
billing services was "voluntary" rather than required by law.
In Information Providers, the Ninth Circuit considered, inter alia, the
petitioners' assertion that FCC regulations requiring an individual wishing to
receive "dial-a-porn" messages to notify the carrier in writing, constituted a prior
restraint. 928 F.2d at 877. The court concluded that no prior restraint was
involved because there was no action on the part of the government to require
governmental approval in advance for speech, or to enjoin, censor or license
speech. Id. Instead, the court found that only telephone companies are involved.
Id at 877-78. Additionally, as they are private actors, they are constitutionally
free to ban dial-a-porn from their networks and/or to refuse to provide billing
services to dial-a-porn information providers. Id. Similar conclusions have been
reached in other cases. See Carlin Communications, 827 F.2d at 1293, 1295,
1297; Dial Info. Servs., 938 F.2d at 1543.
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Meanwhile, a recent District of Columbia Circuit opinion
addressed the constitutionality of Section 10 of the Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992' and
subsequent implementing regulations issued by the FCC authorizing
cable operators to refuse to carry indecent communication on their
leased and public access channels. 6 To date, the courts have
upheld governmental efforts to regulate indecent programming on
cable television and telephone networks by allowing network
operators to exercise substantial control over the flow of such
information in telephony. The courts may uphold such regulation
for cable television.
If these regulations continue withstand judicial scrutiny, they will
provide precedent for network owners' denial of access to users
seeking to engage in constitutionally protected speech. While
network owners have previously been prohibited from exercising
editorial control over the content of protected speech on certain
portions of their networks, they may be able to exercise such
control as constitutionally protected speakers.' Network owners
25. Pub. L. No. 102-385 § 10(a), 10(b), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 531, 532(h), 532(j), 558 (1992)) [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
26. Alliance, 10 F.3d 812. The legislation and regulations authorize cable
television operators to refuse carriage of programming they deem indecent on
their leased access channels. Alternatively, operators may segregate indecent
programming on a particular channel. See 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. No. 102-385
§ 10(a) & 10(b), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532(h),
532(j), 558 (1992)); In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 7 F.C.C.R. 7709 (1992) (notice of
proposed rulemaking); 8 F.C.C.R. 998 (1993) (first report and order); 8 F.C.C.R.
2638 (1993) (second report and order); see also Implementation of Section 10 of
the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 58 Fed. Reg. 7990,
7993 (1993) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.701). Section 10 and the FCC
regulations also allow cable operators to refuse to carry indecent programming on
their public, educational and government (PEG) access channels, and authorize
operators to require programmers to certify that their programs do not contain
indecent material. See Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 58 Fed. Reg. 19,623, 19,626 (1993)
(codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.702). See infra text accompanying notes 217-18 for
a description of PEG access.
27. See Dial Info. Servs., 938 F.2d 1535; Carlin Communications, 827 F.2d
1291; Information Providers, 928 F.2d 866.
28. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909
(E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
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may also refuse to transact business with subscribers in order to
avoid presenting undesireable viewpoints and refuse to provide
services critical to the subscriber's ability to communicate because
they are not classified as telecommunications services.29
The confluence of the technology-forged transitions creates
important opportunities for the increased exercise of electronic
speech, related assembly and associational activities by both
network owners and users. Access to networks is increased while
control over the creation, manipulation and movement of informa-
tion is increasingly decentralized.
Simultaneously, the government's regulatory efforts also create
opportunities for the potential loss of network owners' electronic
speech rights. Judicial decisions opining that cable and local
telephone network owners possess relatively unlimited speech
rights increases the concentration of private control over electronic
speech and its related activities. Similarly, allowing network
owners to restrict the presentation of indecent material increases
their control of electronic speech.
Finally, if state-encouraged "private" exercise of control over
access and speech is distinguished from state action, constitutional
justifications in support of retaining and expanding network user
rights become ineffective. The justification for categorizing user
and subscriber entitlements as rights of access and speech on
current broadcast, cable and telephone networks depends upon a
constitutionally sanctioned characterization of network transmission
providers as quasi-private, quasi-public servants. These servants
extend some measure of user and subscriber control over the
network and the content of communication in exchange for the
receipt of government benefits such as scarce public resources and
monopoly status. In this fashion, "public" access and speech rights
29. Professor Jerome Barron has taken legitimate issue with the circuit court
opinions. Jerome Barron, The Telco, The Common Carrier Model and the First
Amendment - The "Dial-A-Porn" Precedent, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 371, 385-91 (1993). He argues that the courts, in upholding the decisions of
telephone common carriers to refuse carriage or the provision of billing services
to dial-a-porn providers, have given telephone common carriers an unjustified
measure of editorial control over the content of speech transmitted over their
facilities. Id.
19951
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are counterbalanced against private rights in the interest of diversity
and the relative free flow of information.
In its recent efforts to curtail the transmission of troublesome
speech (i.e., indecency), the government has recast network
providers as "private owners." As such, the owners' decisions to
deny access to purveyors of indecent speech are constitutionally
immune. This strategy has achieved mixed success to date.3 °
Where successful, the strategy has resulted in extending the domain
of subscriber or user speech over which the network provider may
exercise direct (or indirect) control. In the process, the government
rewrites the balance in favor of network owners.
Intelligent network, media convergence, and indecency policies
affect the evolution and exercise of electronic speech, assembly and
association at the network function, network access and content
levels. Moreover, they do so at a time when domestic and global
reliance on electronic speech is growing,3' and substantial efforts
30. See Information Providers Coalition for the Defense of the First
Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991); Alliance for Community
Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
31. These activities are increasingly taking place electronically on a global
scale. Indeed, the globalization of the telecommunications infrastructure is
extending to greater numbers of individuals in a growing number of countries with
sometimes unsettling political consequences. For instance, fax machines were
used to keep the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, in contact with the rest of the
world when "hardliners" captured the nation's broadcast facilities during the 1991
Soviet coup attempt. See Alfred C. Sikes (Chairman of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission), Remarks at Communications Week International's "The
Networked Economy Conference" (Mar. 5, 1992) (citing the Feb. 8, 1992 issue
of the EcoNOMIsT). See also John Perry Barlow, Electronic Frontier: The Great
Work, COMM. OF THE ACM, Jan. 1992, at 25. See generally Gladys D. Ganley,
Power to the People via Personal Electronic Media, WASH. Q., Spring 1991, at
2.
Direct-dial telephone lines, computer bulletin boards, fax machines and
computer networks were used by the student dissidents in China to communicate
with the rest of the world during the pro-democracy movement in 1989. Id.
Alternative networks of fax machines and computers were also used in the 1988
Chilean plebiscite to guard against efforts by the "Pinochet" forces to compromise
the vote. Id Fax machines and personal computers allowed Panamanian
dissidents in the United States, Switzerland, Spain, Great Britain and Latin
America to communicate with Panama when Noriega seized control of the
independent broadcast and news media in 1987. Id.
However, the political uses of telecommunications networks should not obscure
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to merge the once competing network owners are well under way.
The judicial and administrative proceedings address access to
programmable intelligent networks, multi-media convergence, and
indecency and define the scope of electronic speech rights on the
interactive, multi-media broadband networks which are evolving
from the antecedent technologies of broadcast, cable and telephony.
First, they significantly affect the physical network in terms of
architecture, functionality and deployment, helping to establish the
limits of what users may actually accomplish on the networks in
terms of the manipulation, transportation and communication of
information. Second, they establish the preliminary scope of user
rights based on the extent to which the government sanctions
owner-exercised control over network access and speech content.
Finally, because they set a significant portion of the networks'
functionality as well as the ownership structure, they set many of
the boundaries and criteria for subsequent judicial adjudication and
apportionment of speech rights.32 As a consequence, they go a
the underlying fundamental uses. These networks can be used to "increase the
number of individuals who can initiate electronic speech and the number of
electronic fora available for assembly within or between countries." See Allen S.
Hammond, Regulating Broadband Communications Networks, 9 YALE J. ON REG.
181, 190 (1992) [hereinafter Regulating Broadband]. The process of globalization
is expected to continue as nations modernize their telecommunications infra-
structures and the cost of transmission continues to drop. See Special Report:
Universal Telephone Service; Ready for the 21st Century?, 1991 Annual Review
of the Institute for Information Studies, EDGE, Dec. 2,1991. In the process, there
is a growing potential for new aggregations of users and individuals to develop,
often forming ephemeral communities of interest or, what one scholar has called
"electronic neighborhoods." Id. Collectively, these communities could combine
to become the "global networked society." See Pekka J. Tarjanne, Open
Frameworks for Telecommunications in the 1990s: Access to Networks and
Markets, TELECOMM., Apr. 1990, at 22.
32. Historically, much of the adjudication and subsequent apportionment of
electronic speech rights has been based upon a technology's architecture and
deployment, as well as the manner in which it is owned. As a consequence,
technical and market-based decisions about network architecture, functionality and
ownership affect the scope of subsequently adjudicated network access and elec-
tronic speech rights.
For instance, broadcast network architecture developed into a point to
multipoint omnidirectional technology based in part on the peculiar characteristics
of radio waves. Among the peculiarities was interference caused by adjacent
frequencies. The technology's characteristics combined with the government's
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significant way in establishing who shall have electronic access and
speech rights and how such rights will be balanced against the
rights of others.
This article examines recently proposed legislation, regulatory
proceedings and current litigation related to the regulation of
indecent speech and network owner control over access and speech
in an attempt to propose how electronic speech rights might be
apportioned in the future. Part I explores how evolving program-
mable, interactive, multi-media, broadband networks could facilitate
the exercise of electronic speech, assembly and association. Part
II reviews recent government efforts to revise the Communications
Act of 1934 in response to expanded opportunities for speech
which network convergence and programmability provide. Part III
briefly discusses the constitutionality of governmental efforts to
mandate user access and/or limit owner access and use of cable and
telephone networks. Part IV briefly examines the constitutionality
of recent government efforts to regulate indecent speech in cable
and telephony by placing significant control over such speech with
the network owner.
The article concludes that how current efforts to limit indecent
creation of frequency scarcity through its spectrum allocation policies and the
industry's desire for market stability and exclusivity resulted in a limited number
of powerful stations per market. By the time the Supreme Court confronted
broadcast regulation in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969),
it faced established network providers with technical and statutorily defined
property and speech rights as well.
In a similar fashion, early cable television technology evolved as a means of
extending broadcast station reception to areas beyond the reach of conventional
broadcast signals. As such, it too was conceived and implemented as a point to
multi-point, omnidirectional, albeit an addressable, multi-channel wire transmis-
sion technology. Government efforts to expand the number of speakers still took
as its template a monopoly property right vested in the government selected
entrepreneur. The cable entrepreneur received geographic market exclusivity and
the use of scarce public property in exchange for ceding access to a portion of the
transmission capacity to other speakers and payment of a fee.
Telephony's technology, contrary to that of broadcasting and cable, was
conceived as two-way, interactive and theoretically entrepreneurial, so that
geographic exclusivity and use of public rights of way paid huge dividends in
public access and speech. As with cable, the courts have had significant
opportunity to address the evolution of the telephone industry from an anti-
competitive monopoly to a hyper-competitive industry.
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speech are accomplished,33 as well as the possible outcomes of
current litigation concerning access to cable and telephone net-
works, ' could result in increased concentration of control over
electronic speech at the network owner level. 5 Such develop-
ments would conflict with government efforts to render current and
future networks more open and subject to greater user control as
opposed to owner control.36 Moreover, such developments could
severely limit potential opportunities for expanded electronic
speech, assembly and association by network users.
Ideally, policies placing the responsibility for electronic speech
with the actual speaker, while encouraging owner and user access,
speech, and control over the network, better assure the realization
of electronic First Amendment rights. Further, such policies may
be pursued and implemented consistently with First Amendment
prohibitions on government regulation of protected speech and
related associational and assembly activities.
Finally, the article concludes that the government, in the process
of managing market entry and firm competition, runs the risk of
ceding creation and control of speech activities to private firms.
This is particularly true to the extent that the First Amendment is
33. For example, the dial-a-porn decisions arguably support the proposition
that carriers may deny functional access to their networks. First, the services
necessary to render a use viable are not "carrier" services but private. Second,
access may be denied for "private business reasons" which may be motivated by
constitutionally questionable government threats of prosecution or anti-competitive
motivation. See supra note 13.
34. For instance, decisions that telephone and cable companies possess
relatively unfettered speech rights over their facilities could result in the loss of
the significant availability of non-discriminatory common carrier and public
access.
35. The confluence of increased network provider liability for user speech
coupled with increased network provider control over access and editorial
decisions could result in perfectly rational decisions to limit access and speech in
order to limit liability. Broadcast licensees and cable franchisees have succumbed
to such logic before.
36. Much of the philosophical thrust of current legislative and administrative
initiatives to create open, broadband platforms for the transmission of non-network
provider information, as well as FCC efforts to facilitate open network architec-
ture and advanced intelligent networks' policies, would be blunted by policies
combining network provider liability for user speech with greater network
provider control over access and content.
1995]
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interpreted solely as a negative bar to government censorship rather
than as an affirmative protection for speech activities threatened by
private action.
I. ACCESS, ELECTRONIC SPEECH, AND CONVERGENCE
A. Electronic Speech
1. Video-Speech
Electronic video communication is a constitutionally protected
form of speech.37 Some individuals and groups, in addition to the
cable network owner, engage in video communication over cable
television channels through a variety of access regulations. These
regulations afford programmers unaffiliated with the cable owner
(including commercial programmers, citizens, educators and
government officials) an opportunity to communicate with a
portion of the cable viewing audience."
Regardless of programmer affiliation, electronic video flows one
way from the programmer to the cable subscribing audience via the
cable network. The audience cannot interact directly with the
programmer in real time without resorting to another communica-
tions network, such as a telephone network. As a result, the
speaker and the audience cannot truly electronically assemble or
associate in the "same place at the same time." Additionally,
regardless of their interactive limitations, cable access channels,
whether required by "must-carry" regulations,39 public, educational
or government (PEG) access rules" or by leased access rules,"
provide electronic speech opportunities to non-affiliated entities,
groups and individuals. Consequently, they increase the diversity
of speakers and information available to the subscribing audience.
The information communicated includes that of a work-related,
37. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
38. See discussion infra part lI.C.
39. See discussion infra part III.C.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 217-18.
41. See infra text accompanying note 219.
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scientific, educational, political, personal and/or illicit nature."
2. Tele-Speech
Individuals using telephone, computer and fax-augmented
interactive telecommunications networks engage in electronic
speech and assemble and associate electronically to share informa-
tion. Through electronic mail services, on-line computer bulletin
boards, computer conferencing services, host computer facilities
and digital libraries,43 network users are able to interact by voice,
text, and increasingly, by video." They become speakers and
publishers45 who have the ability to electronically associate on a
deferred or real-time basis in ephemeral or formal electronic
42. See Bill Duryea & Brad Snyder, They Preach Hate of Public Access TV,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 12, 1993, at Al (addressing the difficulties raised
by the use of a cable public access channel to promote ideas of the Nazis and the
Ku Klux Klan); Bill Duryea, Cable TV Obscenity Issue Flares, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993, at lB, (discussing difficulties in preventing the presentation
of arguably obscene programming on cable public access channels); David
McLemore, Trying to Pull the Plug; San Antonio Cable TV Suicide Guide Angers
Many, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Nov. 14, 1992, at Al; see also Kelly
Thompson, Cable Channel Excites Interest Among Teachers, NEWS & RECORD,
Aug. 17, 1994, at BG1 (education); Martin Miller, TV Brings City Councils to
O.C. Homes - Warts and All, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994, at Al (politics); Jim
Adams, This Town Meeting Will be Electric; Dakota County Goes Interactive,
STAR TRIB., Jan. 12, 1994, at B1 (politics); Penny Roberts, Video Gives Poor
Teens Their Voice, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1993, § 2 at 7 (individual speech); June
Cavarretta, Teacher's Videos a Class Act: Kids Get to Star and Learn at Same
Time, CI. TRIB., Jul. 25, 1993, at 1 (education); Ted Appel, Wilson Debuts
'Infomercial' on State Budget Woes, UPI, May 11, 1993 (politics); Anthony
Milligan, Abortion Issue Aired on Cable TV; Broadcasting: Two Programs on
Torrance Public Access Channel Present Opposing Views of the Volatile Topic,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, at B7 (public controversy debate).
43. A digital library would provide in digital electronic format, a large portion
of the resources of a traditional library. See Virtual National Library: Library of
Congress Proposes Nation's Digital Library, COMM. DALY, Sept. 12, 1994, at 1.
44. Rex S. Heinke & Heather D. Rafter, Proprietary Rights; Rough Justice
in Cyberspace: Liability on the Electronic Frontier, COMP. LAW., July 1994, at
1; Doug Schler, Community Networks: Building a New Participatory Medium,
COMM. OF THE ACM, Jan. 1994, at 38; The National Information Infrastructure:
Agenda forAction, By the Information Infrastructure Task Force, DAILY REP. FOR
ExECUrIvES, Sept. 16, 1993, at M178; Tom Nolle, Groupware: The Next
Generation; New Applications, Bus. COMM. REv., Aug. 1993, at 54.
45. See ITHIEL DE SOLO POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 250-51 (1983).
1995]
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communities. Similarly, users may electronically assemble in real
time by voice, video, text or multimedia via on-line computer
bulletin board services or conferencing services. The types of
speech engaged in over these networks range from activities related
to the creation, receipt, and editing of information to interactive
communication between two or more persons."
Because of the broad access afforded to the public by the
switched voice and packet networks to which the above-referenced
services are connected, individuals and groups increasingly have
the means to call information to the attention of a far greater
portion of the public.47 The telephone, "the poor man's transmit-
ter,"4 8 through the use of computers and telecommunications
networks, has become a powerful transmission tool which is
capable of turning private conversations into public discourses.49
The level of electronic speech, assembly and association afforded
to individual users and groups by the computer-augmented public
switched network stands in stark contrast to that of traditional
broadcast, cable and voice telephone networks. In the case of
broadcasting and cable, communication is overwhelmingly
"downstream" from the network owner/speaker to the mass
audience.5" Opportunities for assembling or associating for the
purpose of communicating or sharing information are limited by
46. See Steve Lohr, Sound Bytes: Therapy on a Virtual Couch, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 1994, at 7; Sandy Rovner, Molesting Children By Computer, WASH.
Posr, Aug. 2, 1994, at Z15; Patricia Horn, Computers Link Kids Worldwide,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, May 9, 1994, at 12; Daniel Cerone, Hollywood
On-Line, L.A. TnMEs, Apr. 17, 1994, at 7; Kirk Johnson, On-Line Romance;
Office Workers Feel Cupid's Byte, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1994, at 21; Brad Patten,
Sex Rides the Fast Lane on Info Superhighway, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Feb. 7, 1994,
at Cl; James Crawley, Internet Serves Up the World A La Modem With Access
to a Huge Range of Data and Ideas; The Net Hauls In Computer Users
Worldwide, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Dec. 7, 1993, at 18.
47. See Data Communications Glossary, DATA COMM., Mar. 1988, at 229;
Frank J. Derfler, Jr., Linking LANs: Making the WAN Connection, P.C. MAG.,
Mar. 16, 1993, at 183.
48. Stephen Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of
Consent, 93 YALE L. J. 581, 599 n.93 (1984).
49. See Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and
Cyberspace, 38 VIIL. L. REV. 403, 414 (1993); Brenda Sapino, Building the
Future, TEx. LAw., Oct. 12, 1992, at 1.
50. See Burke & Nusbaum, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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technology, law and the network owner.5 Efforts to engage in
interactive communication via broadcast television or cable
television require a second network such as a telephone to
communicate "upstream" from the audience to the own-
er/speaker.5 2 In the case of broadcasting or cable television,
communication between members of the audience unmediated by
the network owner is not possible.53 Thus, in contrast to broad-
cast and cable technology, the switched interactive technology upon
which computer augmented public switched network (PSN) relies
affords far greater opportunities for unmediated electronic speech,
assembly and association between network users.-
Plain old telephone service (POTS) is basically a one-to-one
interactive service. This is in contrast to computer-augmented
switched networks which allow interactive communications
between two individuals, an individual and a group, or between
groups. The more open, interconnected and accessible the switched
network, the greater the opportunity individuals and groups have
to impart, receive and share diverse information.55 Under such
circumstances, individuals and groups gain greater speech empow-
erment and access to information is increasingly democratized.56
3. Tele-Speech and Telecommunications Architecture
Much of the current voice, fax and computer-augmented
information services which have extended the scope of electronic
speech, assembly and associational activities rely on switched voice
and packet switching which is provided by the long distance and
local exchange portions of the public switched telecommunications
network (PSTN).57 Providers of future information and electronic
51. See Regulating Broadband, supra note 31.
52. See Burke & Nusbaum, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
53. See Regulating Broadband, supra note 31.
54. Id
55. See Katsh, supra note 49.
56. FCC Chairman Alfred C. Sikes, Remarks Before the Freedom Forum
Media Studies Center, National Conference on Media, Democracy, and the
Information Highway (Oct. 27, 1992).
57. The PSTN is the backbone telephone network over which the majority of
voice, and a substantial portion of data information, is transmitted and received.
It is composed of the local and regional networks of local exchange carriers such
1995]
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publishing services will also rely on the PSTN. Presently, local
exchange networks still rely on central office switches which house
the computer intelligence needed to manipulate and route calls. 8
Networks using this intelligence are called "intelligent net-
works."
5 9
In intelligent networks (INs), the software-define&0 network
as the RBOCs and GTE, as well as the long distance networks of interexchange
carriers such as AT&T, MCI and Sprint. It transports voice and/or data
transmissions made by subscribers between central office exchanges on the
local/regional networks and/or the long distance networks. See Regulating
Broadband, supra note 31; Steve G. Parsons, Seien Years after Kahn and Shew:
Lingering Myths on Costs and Pricing Telephone Service, 11 YALE J. ON REG.
149 (1994).
58. The current state of telecommunications network development is similar
to that of the computer industry in the 1950s and early 1960s. See David G.
Anderson & William C. Pennington, Service Creation and the AIN, TEPHONY,
May 18, 1992, at 28. During that time period, the development of software
necessary to run computer applications was controlled by computer manufacturers.
Id However, as the computer became an essential part of business enterprises,
and systems containing embedded processors were developed in the late 1960s,
users and manufacturers established their own software and software development
departments. Id As a result of the computer industry's shift to open interfaces
and standard products, almost anyone can produce software for any computer. Id.
Consequently, software manufacturing has become a major industry. Id
Today's telecommunications networks are controlled in much the same way that
computer software manufacturers used to control software development. Id.
Switched networks are essentially run by large, often monolithic, distributed
computer systems relying on software controlled by network equipment
manufacturers and telecommunications providers. Id.
59. "Intelligence" refers to the set of services offered on the message trunk
network. These services are essentially various modes of handling user calls. See
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, The First Amendment, and Equal Access to
Electronic Networks, 5 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 65 (1992); Gail Garfield Schwartz
& Jeffrey H. Hoagg, Virtual Divesture: Structural Reform of an RHC, 44 FED.
COMM. L.J. 285 (1992); Andrew C. Barrett, Public Policy and the Advanced
Intelligent Network, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 413 (1990).
60. In the past, the provision of services in the public switched network was
essentially hardware-defined. New services were provided by configuration of
transmission capacity and characteristics and the selection of differing methods
of customer interconnection. At that time, switching was a relatively simple
function of establishing a connection between two transmission paths. Today, the
introduction of new services and features is increasingly software-defined.
Switching has become more than the establishment of a transmission path; it
includes the use of high-level intelligence to direct information to users based
upon the place of origin, the time of day, user input, information stored in a
HeinOnline  -- 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 22 1995
19951 MULTI-MEDIA CHIMERA
switching intelligence is located in central office switch databases
and is connected to the PSTN. In this structure, the switching
network's function is limited to recognizing that a dialed number
corresponds to a particular IN service. The service relays the
message to a database which then responds to instructions from the
central office computer database." All of the "intelligence" in the
IN is located in one central node called the Service Control Point
(SCP) database and the off-line management systems which are
used to program the SCP.62 However, as originally conceived and
implemented, each SCP of an intelligent network offered only one
service. A new SCP and significant programming work would be
required to add a new service.63
Currently, standardization bodies, operators and equipment
manufacturers are attempting to create INs that are service and
network-independent. 64 In these Advanced Intelligent Networks
database and other parameters.
61. Intelligent networks currently provide database translations to support 800
service, as well as line information database function support for caller ID,
distinctive ringing and last number call back services. Steven Titch, The Pathway
to Freedom: Local Exchange Carrier, Advanced Intelligent Network Services,
TELEPHONY, Apr. 15, 1991, at 30.
62. The prototype IN design contained requirements for a connection between
telephone exchanges and a central office computer database. Service Switching
Point (SSP) functionality was later built into newer IN-oriented switches to handle
communications between the switch-based SCPs and the telephone exchanges.
See John Williamson, Smart Networks Equal Big Bucks, TELEPHONY, Mar. 2,
1992, at 18; see also Derek Underwood, AIN Standards: Controversy or
Evolution, TELEPHONY, Dec. 23, 1991, at 14; Ann Lindstrom et al., Making the
Transition to the New Network, TELEPHONY, Feb. 25, 1991, at 36.
63. See Underwood, supra note 62, at 14. The installation of central
databases in each local office caused several problems. Williamson, supra note
62, at 18. Logistical problems occurred when software needed to be changed or
augmented. Id. The network operator was dependent upon its central office
switch suppliers to provide necessary software changes. Id. And, the intelligent
network applications which were network and service dependent were also based
on proprietary systems. See id. at 19-20.
64. See Titch, supra note 61. This leads to other problems. Williamson, supra
note 62, at 18. For instance, the interconnection of general intelligence network
services with "line-related" specialized intelligence offerings means that the
number of disparate intelligence service platforms increases, and thus the potential
for greater trunking, switching, maintenance and interworking difficulties
develops. Id. As a result, trunking and switching deployment is likely to be
governed by economics and demand. Id. at 20.
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(AINs), some of the intelligence previously located in the central
office switch would be distributed throughout the network to other
nodes."
AINs are intended to permit telecommunications and enhanced
service providers, as well as their respective customers, to augment
existing services or create new ones to meet customers' individual
needs.' It is anticipated that services will be augmented or
created through the use of what some have called the "service
creation environment."'  A service creation environment is
composed of a central office switch and intelligence distributed
among multiple nodes, each able to direct the central office switch
to engage in specified manipulations of information. Regardless of
its name or its ultimate components, enhanced service providers
and users who have access to the telephone companies' service
creation environments ultimately will be able to revise and/or
create new services.6" In essence, the central office switching
65. Carol Wilson, CO Products Develop New Revenue Opportunities,
TELEPHONY, Apr. 9, 1990, at 38. Many RBOCs are in the process of testing AIN
applications. See Titch, supra note 61, at 30.
However, efforts to develop the AIN have received significant criticism. For
instance, the Coalition of Open Network Architecture Parties (CONAP) has
questioned whether RBOC designs for AIN comply with FCC requirements for
Open Network Architecture. Id. CONAP has claimed that the design allows the
RBOCs to concentrate control of the new service offerings in their hands alone.
Id at 30-31.
66. "Intelligent network choices include faster and more sophisticated voice
and data capabilities; more flexible routing and distribution alternatives; and
private telecommunications networks with unique, customer-specific designs."
Commissioner Sherrie Marshall, Huck Finn and the Intelligent Network, Remarks
Before the Advanced Intelligent Network Communications Forum (June 25, 1990)
[hereinafter Huck Finn].
67. Anderson & Pennington, supra note 58, at 28-29. Some telco users and
providers have argued that a "modular and transparent" network architecture with
standard interfaces would allow end-users access to unbundled switch functionali-
ties that they could use to write "service scripts" responsive to market needs.
CONAP Petition, at 6, cited in In re Intelligent Networks, 6 F.C.C.R. 7256, 7257
(1991). RBOCs have already begun to use service creation technology to deliver
new services to customers. See Titch, supra note 61, at 30.
68. Service creation flexibility within the intelligent network would allow
enhanced service providers, large corporate users and individual consumers to
"tailor basic communications services to meet their individual needs." See Huck
Finn, supra note 66. Many of the services may simply consist of new ways to
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system and the telecommunications networks it serves, would
become more accessible and "user friendly." Increased user access
to service creation environments provide users with the ability to
create, manipulate and route information in new and previously
unanticipated ways. 9 The ability to program the network to meet
users' particular communications needs could include accessing
information residing on host computers, reorganizing and transmit-
ting information and gaining access to widely dispersed individuals
or groups who may have an interest in the created or reorganized
information.7"
B. Constitutional Protection of Electronic Speech on Cable and
Telephone Networks
Electronic communication by telephone, broadcast station or
cable system which is not "obscene," is constitutionally protected
organize, house and manipulate information. Other services will consist of new
ways of increasing access to information and/or creating information. Service
creation flexibility is expected to evolve from the laboratory, to the telephone
technician and marketer, and ultimately to the customer. See Titch, supra note 61,
at 30.
69. Sega, NEC, CSK to Establish Network Karaoke Company, NEC WKLY,
Oct. 7, 1994; Edmund L. Andrews, Business Technology: Opening Nation's Phone
Networks, N.Y. TIWEs, Jan. 16, 1991, at D5.
70. It has been suggested that the achievement of such accessibility should be
a goal of the nation's telecommunications policy. See Perritt, supra note 59, at
71.
In the future, users will be able to use applications such as a service
creation environment (SCE) to craft their own applications on a
workstation with icon-based programming capabilities. Users could
build links between on-screen icons that represent specific call
processing tasks, such as collecting dialed digits or playing a recording.
When completed, a file is uploaded to a carrier's service management
system (SMS), which replaces the icons with the actual lines of software
code needed to build the application... In many ways, these icons can
be viewed as building blocks for developing many services or applica-
tions ... With each customer-initiated application, the [carrier's]
building block library grows, moving toward an environment in which
customers can create their own services and applications from terminals
in their offices.
The Network Graduates. Carriers' Gradual Installation of Equipment and
Software Instills Networks with Newfound Intelligence, NETWORK WORLD, Aug.
3, 1992, at 34.
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speech. Thus, information transmitted in electronic form,
whether in the form of print, video or voice, enjoys First Amend-
ment protection. However, recognizing that electronic print, video
and voice communications are constitutionally protected when
transmitted over telephone, broadcasting and cable television does
not end the inquiry because it does not indicate whose speech is
protected.
The First Amendment protects the exercise of speech and
editorial control over programming decisions and transmissions by
broadcast licensees.72 It protects the exercise of speech and
71. Speech deemed "obscene" is not afforded constitutional protection and
indecent communications via broadcasting, cable or telephony may be regulated
to shield protected classes of individuals. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). Indecent communications via broadcast, cable or telephony may be
regulated to shield protected classes of individuals. See Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282
(1992); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Alliance for Community
Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated on other grounds, 15 F.3d
186 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
72. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Red
Lion, the Supreme Court recognized that broadcasters have a qualified right to
free speech. Broadcasters' rights were held secondary to the rights of listeners
and viewers to receive diverse information and ideas. Id at 389. The Court
stated:
[The First Amendment] has a major role to play [in public broadcasting]
as Congress itself recognized in section 326, which forbids FCC
interference with 'the right of free speech by means of radio commun-
ication' . . . But the people as a whole retain their interest in free
speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters
which is paramount ... It is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.
Id
Over time, the broadcast licensee's right to free speech has been expanded. See
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(holding that broadcasters may not be compelled to accept editorial advertisements
for broadcast when they are already adhering to an obligation to present
controversial issues of public importance fairly; they retain the right to decide
what controversial issues are to be discussed, by whom, and when). Most
recently, the D.C. Circuit affirmed that the Fairness Doctrine "chilled"
broadcasters' exercise of their editorial discretion, caused a reduction in the
HeinOnline  -- 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 26 1995
1995] MULTI-MEDIA CHIMERA
editorial discretion by cable television operators.73 Similarly, the
First Amendment protects subscriber voice communications over
the telephone 4 and video communication by local exchange
network operators."
While owners of broadcast and cable television facilities have a
constitutionally protected right of speech, efforts of viewers and
non-affiliated programmers to gain access to the facilities of
broadcast and cable network entities or to mandate the carriage of
certain speech have met with diminishing success in broadcasting
and limited success in cable.76  Additionally, local telecommu-
nications network owners have only recently been deemed video
speakers for constitutional analyses. Meanwhile, users of telecom-
coverage of controversial issues, and hence disserved the First Amendment
interests of the public. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against
Television Station WTVH Syracuse, New York, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), recon.
denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), affid, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
The Commission largely relied upon technological grounds to advocate the
repeal of the Fairness Doctrine stating, "[w]e believe that the dramatic changes
in the electronic media, together with the unacceptable chilling effect resulting
from the implementation of such regulations as the fairness doctrine, form a
compelling and convincing basis on which to reconsider First Amendment
principles that were developed for another market." Syracuse Peace Council, 2
F.C.C.R. at 5054.
73. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991); Los Angeles v. Preferred
Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
74. Indecent communication by telephone is entitled to some protection under
the First Amendment. See Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989) (telephone communications that are obscene according
to some local standards will not be according to the standards of another
community); American Info. Enters., Inc. v. Thornburgh, 742 F. Supp. 1255,
1260-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the
First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 870 (9th Cir. 1991).
75. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir.
1994). See Edmund Andrews, Ruling Frees Phone Concerns to Enter Cable TV
Business, N.Y. TnMs, Aug. 25, 1993, at Al (discussing Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co.); see also Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C.
§ 533(b)(1988) (prohibiting local telephone companies from providing video
programming to potential viewers in its service area directly or indirectly through
an entity owned by the telephone company or under its common control).
Waivers have been granted under statute and FCC rule. See FCC Upholds GTE
Cerritos Waiver, Grants Another, BROADCASTING, May 1, 1989, at 136.
76. See discussion infra part lIM.C.
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munications networks, information providers and subscribers are
deemed to possess more expansive rights of free speech than the
common carrier network providers upon whom they rely.
As antecedent technologies of telephony, broadcast, cable and
print merge into a multi-functional broadband switched network,
the voice, video and data information streams, as well as network
transmission functions, also merge. Consequently, both the
universe in which network owner and user speech rights were
previously apportioned and the manner in which they are currently
apportioned are changing. Since speech conducted over the broad-
cast, cable and telecommunications networks is constitutionally
protected, it is reasonable that speech will be protected when
conducted on a succeeding technology that merges speech modes
and network functions." However, the critical question is not
whether electronic speech merits protection, but rather, whose
electronic speech will be protected? And furthermore, to what
extent will such speech be protected in relation to the perceived
speech rights of others?
The merger of network transmission functions and information
streams changes the number of parties with potential claims of
rights. Apportioning the relative weight assigned to the speech
rights of network owners, information providers and network users
on interactive, multi-media, broadband networks necessitates the
development of a new paradigm as the existing regulatory
structures for broadcasting, cable and telephony prove inadequate.
Information providers and end users could become active -rather
than passive participants in the network communications, switching
and call routing process. They would gain more control over how
their information is routed to and from potential receivers. End
users would also become potential information providers as
opposed to mere information consumers. Network owners such as
the local exchange telephone carriers (LECs) that come to the new
merged technology without experience with owner-initiated video
77. The merger will not change the visual, aural or character elements which
serve as the building blocks for speech, nor will it affect the manner in which the
elements are combined to achieve mono-modal communication. Even when these
separate streams are merged, no new set of basic elements is created.
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speech may have opportunities for such speech. These owners,
relying on the structure of rights developed in print, broadcasting
and cable, may assert the existence of speech rights of their own.
Finally, information providers having no ownership of the cable or
telecommunications network may also assert speech rights.
Aside from the changing apportionment of speech rights, the
merger of network functions and information streams raises another
compelling question of whose speech the technology will be
allowed to promote. This is not a restatement of the earlier
question of protection. Recognizing that once the technical
parameters and characteristics of a mode of information transmis-
sion and access are established, the courts necessarily look to
application of prior precedent and comparative analysis of
technology and markets to determine the relative rights a potential
speaker may enjoy.78 However, another equally critical stage in
the evolution of rights occurs and reoccurs when the parameters
and characteristics of the technology of transmission are in
substantial flux.79
78. Ithiel de Sola Pool addresses this issue in part when he speaks of the "soft
technological determinism" inherent in the interaction between changing
technologies of communication and the practice of free speech. ITHIEL DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIEs OF FREEDOM 5-8 (1983).
79. Indeed, the time at which government has the greatest opportunity to
promote expanded free speech opportunities or restrict them has historically been
during times of technological change.
For instance, between 1927 and 1934, Congress considered numerous ways in
which access to the developing broadcasting technology might be assured. It
considered and rejected requiring broadcasters to act as common carriers, deciding
instead that they be regulated as businesses affected with a public purpose. It
refused to prohibit broadcasters from charging for access to programming they
might provide to the public, even though some members recognized that charging
for service would potentially limit public access to broadcast information.
Finally, Congress and the FCC settled on an allocation scheme that ultimately
limited the number and competitive nature of the broadcast marketplace. The
establishment of clear AM channels assured that fewer channels could be
allocated per market because of channel interference. The subsequent decision to
intermix VHF and UHF television frequencies once UHF was introduced, doomed
UHF stations to less competitive niches in their respective markets and viewers
to technologically inferior access. Because of the intermixture decision, VHF
stations not only enjoyed earlier market entry, but greater frequency propagation
characteristics which assured greater market coverage and superior reception.
From the viewers' perspective, greater access was provided in theory, but the
19951
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At such a time, legislative and regulatory choices regarding
technical standards and technology configuration will lay the
foundation for the exercise of speech activities and set the stage for
subsequent judicial adjudication and apportionment of speech
rights. 0 At times, technology increases the number of speech
activities by expanding the opportunities to exercise speech. The
creation of UHF channels, VHF drop-ins and cable television are
such instances.8' At other times, technology creates the opportu-
nity to exercise speech in new ways such as the advent of
broadband and distributed intelligence technologies.
II. CONVERGENCE, ELECTRONIC SPEECH AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATION
Recent presidential administrations, Congress, and the FCC have
been developing a new regulatory scheme which addresses various
aspects of the convergence of industries and markets. 2 For
instance, the FCC sought to implement its video dial-tone policy
as an alternative to congressional efforts to impose rate regulation
on cable operators.83 The FCC reasoned that allowing telephone
company entry into the video distribution marketplace would create
competitive pressures to reduce prices for services while increasing
poorer propagation characteristics of UHF coupled with the electronic industry's
reluctance to manufacture televisions which could receive UHF signals rendered
access illussory.
Similarly, in the early seventies, as cable television evolved into a viable, high
capacity, multi-channel distribution medium in urban areas, the FCC took the
opportunity to expand public access to video speech via cable by promulgating
public and leased access provisions.
80. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), illustrates this point well. The majority based a
substantial portion of its justification for distinguishing the type of constitutional
scrutiny to be applied to cable as opposed to broadcasting or newspapers on the
technical characteristics of the medium.
81. The creation of UHF, VHF drop-ins and cable television expanded the
number of six megahertz video transmission channels available by spectrum (UHF
and VHF) and by wire (cable) for the distribution of video communication. As
such, they increased the number of opportunities to communicate in a manner
previously established via the introduction of VHF frequencies.
82. See Private Networks, supra note 3; Regulating Broadband, supra note
31.
83. See sources supra note 14 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline  -- 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 30 1995
1995] MULTI-MEDIA CHIMERA
access for nonaffiliated progranmers. Similarly, the courts,
Congress and the FCC have addressed issues arising out of local
telephone entry into electronic publishing and information
services. 5  During recent administrations, the FCC has also
sought to establish a structural safeguards86 policy to address the
84. See Edmund L. Andrews, In Twist, Consumer Group and F.C.C. Back
Cable TV, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1994, at Dl; Gene Yasuda, Phone Firms Covet
Cable TV Market, and Cable Industry Raises the Alarm, L.A. TIMEs, June 12,
1990, at D2A.
Newspaper publishers, cable programmers and broadcasters, who would
comprise a significant portion of the potential information providers on a
telecommunications-carrier-provided broadband network, have alleged that the
local telephone companies would engage in anti-competitive activities if the telcos
were allowed to become providers of information services. Thus, until recently,
broadcasters and cable operators opposed limited local telephone company entry
into the video distribution services market via FCC's video dial tone proposal
absent significant structural safeguards. See Harry A. Jessell, Video Dial Tone
Advances at FCC: Commissioners Propose to Establish Regulatory Framework
for Telcos to Deliver TV Services, BROADCASTING, Oct. 28, 1991, at 26; Cable
Attacks VDT, Rural Exemption Extension, TELEVISION DIG., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1;
Charles Mason, Who are the Real Monopolists? Telcos, NCTA Trade Charges;
Telephone Companies, National Cable Television Association, TELEPHONY, Dec.
26, 1988, at 10.
85. Newspaper publishers opposed removal of the prohibition to telco entry
into the information services market by supporting introduction of legislation to
restrict telco entry. See RHCs Assail Cooper Bill on MFJ as Anticompetitive; Bell
Regional Holding Companies' Jim Cooper, Modified Final Judgement, COMM.
DAILY, Oct. 9, 1991, at 1. Efforts by legislators and the local telephone industry
to have telco entry into the video distribution market become the legislative fix
for recent anti-competitive activity by cable operators were unsuccessful. See US
Congress Set to Re-Examine Ban on Cable-Telephony Cross-Ownership, FINTECH
TELECOM MARKETS, Jan. 24, 1991.
86. In telecommunications, the term "structural safeguards" refers to the
separation of a vertically integrated firm into corporate segments based upon
whether they provide basic network services or enhanced services. See Thomas
A. Hart, Jr., The Evolution of Telco-Constructed Broadband Services for CATV
Operations, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 697, 734 (1985); Laura L. Sardo, The AT&T
Decision: The D.C. Circuit Rings the Bell on Judicial Activism, 55 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 781, 785 (1987); Robert M. Frieden, The Third Computer Inquiry: A
Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 383 (1987).
The FCC defined "enhanced services" as services "which employ computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar
aspect of the subscriber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber
additional, different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction
with stored information." 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1993). Enhanced services
include data processing services as well as videotext audiotext, database retrieval
HeinOnline  -- 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 31 1995
32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
and other computer and communications technologies applications. See Marilyn
R. Stahl, Affordable Rates: The Case Against FCC Preemption of Telephone
Depreciation, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 517 (1986); Bruce A. Olcott, Will They Take
Away My Video-Phone If I Get Lousy Ratings? A Proposal for a Video Common
Carrier Statute in Post-merger Telecommunications, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1558,
1565-66 (1994).
The goal of open networks architecture (ONA) policies of which "structural
separations policy" was a part, was to prevent the ability of the RBOCs to
underwrite their provision of competitive enhanced and information services with
monies garnered from their basic network monopoly. At least one court was
highly skeptical of the ONA plan's efficacy in either its Computer II form or its
subsequent Computer III form. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F.
Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987). Ironically, the same mechanisms of the ONA plans
which Judge Harold Greene found so ineffective in Western Electric are the very
mechanisms the FCC proposes to implement under its post California v. FCC, 905
F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) modified Computer III regulations.
After a significant number of administrative hearings and judicial proceedings,
there is still no agreement on how structural safeguards ought to be employed.
In the Computer 11 decision, the FCC reversed its previous requirement that the
RBOCs could provide enhanced services only through a structurally separate
subsidiary corporation. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, recon.,
84 F.C.C.2d 50, clarified on further recon., 88 F.C.C.2d 512, affd sub nom.
Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Furnishing
Customer Premises Equipment, Enhanced Services and Cellular Communications
by Bell Operating Companies, 95 F.C.C.2d 1117 (BOC Separation Order), affd
sub nom. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1984), recon.
denied, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,056, aff'd sub nom. North Am. Telecommunication Ass'n
v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1985).
The FCC determined that it would be sufficient for the RBOCs to provide
enhanced services as integrated entities and offer their "unbundled" basic network
functions to other enhanced service providers on a tariffed, nondiscriminatory
basis. See Third Computer Inquiry, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 964-65, 1063-66 (1986);
Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, 4 F.C.C.R. 1, recon., 5
F.C.C.R. 3084, amended plans conditionally approved, 5 F.C.C.R. 3103 (1990).
The FCC concluded that the requirement to unbundle the network functions,
combined with accounting and other non-structural safeguards would obviate the
need to rely on the separate subsidiary requirement to prevent the RBOCs from
engaging in access discrimination and anticompetitive cross-subsidization which
would favor their enhanced service operations. See Third Computer Inquiry, 104
F.C.C.2d at 1007-12, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035, 3039 (1987).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the FCC's
Computer III rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the FCC had not provided
sufficient support in the record for its conclusion that structural separation was no
longer needed to prevent RBOC attempts at cross-subsidization and that
accounting safeguards alone would be sufficient. 905 F.2d at 1238-39. The court
concluded instead that the FCC's proposed policy to allow the telephone
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concern that the RBOCs would use cross-subsidies and accounting
standards to compete unfairly in the competitive provision of
enhanced and/or information services. The vast majority of the
evolving regulatory scheme focuses on market entry and competi-
tion issues that attend the creation and deployment of the informa-
tion highway. 7
companies into the enhanced services market on a vertically integrated basis
would increase the RBOCs' incentives to engage in anti-competitive activity to
maintain or increase their market share for enhanced services. ld.; see also Public
Service Commission Paper Attacks Computer IH Ruling, WORLDWIDE VIDEOTEX
TELE-SERviCE NEWS, July 1993.
In the FCC's Computer III proceedings following the court decision, the
comments were predictable: "[tlhe Bell regional holding companies (RHC)
endorsed, and enhanced service providers (ESP) opposed, the FCC's hopes to
slightly modify its accounting and non-discrimination rules." RHCS, ESPS, States
Form Familiar Lines in Computer III Reman4 BOC WEEK, Mar. 18, 1991.
Subsequent to the court's decision, the FCC quickly reinstated its ONA
requirements including its waiver of the structural safeguards.
It required that the RBOCs implement their plans to offer unbundled services
regardless of its ultimate decision on structural separation. See In re Computer
EI Remand Proceedings, 5 F.C.C.R. 7719 (1990); In re Computer 11 Remand
Proceedings, 6 F.C.C.R. 174 (1991). Pending the ultimate decision, the RBOCs
were allowed to continue offering enhanced services previously approved by the
FCC, as fully integrated companies.
The decision was not well received in some quarters. For instance, in response
to the FCC's decision, the District of Columbia Pubic Service Commission
(DCPSC) took issue with the FCC's justifications for removing the separate
subsidiary requirement. The DCPSC argued that a separate subsidiary structure
for the provision of new (competitive) services by the RBOCs would not inhibit
the introduction of new services, nor would they impede competition in certain
markets or cause consumer disruptions. See Robert J. Butler, In the Aftermath of
California v. FCC: Computer III Remand Proceedings Pose Di icult Policy
Choices For the Enhanced Services Industry, COMP. LAW., May 1991, at 24.
87. For instance, the Clinton Administration is seeking to stimulate economic
development through the use of telecommunications networks. See Excerpt of the
Hearing of the Senate Committee, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 24, 1993 (Remarks
of Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown); see also Louis Uchitelle, Clinton's Point
Man on Economics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1992, at A33.
Congressional efforts have been similar in focus. See Communications, Senate
Subcommittee Examines Bill Allowing Telephone Companies Into Cable, DAILY
REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar. 2, 1992, at A14; Boucher: We Must Ensure Access
For All, ELEC. MEDIA, Mar. 1, 1993, at 29 (emphasizing the need to have a tele-
communications network that is universally available in order to assist in
stimulating economic development and delivery of health and educational
services); see also House Committee Okays Bill To Link Rural, Urban Schools,
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The importance of merging networks to electronic speech and
related activities has concerned various scholars and industry
observers for some time." Although competing industries have
EDUC. TEC-. NEws, July 7, 1992 (discussing House approval of a bill that would
authorize $20 million in grants to create a national telecommunications network
linking schools in rural areas with their counterparts in urban regions); The
Honorable Conrad Burns (Senator), The Cable TV Problem - A Procompetitive
Approach, PuB. UTIL. FoRTNIGHTLY, Aug. 16, 1990, at 16 (proposing to allow
telephone companies into the video distribution market to compete against cable
television firms as a way to increase consumer choices in price and service
offerings and to assure timely deployment of fiber optic infrastructure).
For legislative proposals to reform the regulatory scheme, see Communications
Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1993, H.R. 1504, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (a bill to encourage the modernization of the nation's tele-
communications infrastructure, to promote competition in the cable television
industry and to permit telephone companies to provide video programming);
Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991,
S. 1200, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (a bill to advance the national interest by
promoting the rapid development and deployment of a nationwide, advanced,
interactive, interoperable, broadband communications infrastructure on or before
2015 by ensuring the greater availability of, access to, investment in, and use of
emerging communications technologies, as well as for other purposes); Communi-
cations Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991, H.R. 2546,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (same as S. 1200); Communications Competetive-
ness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1980, S. 2800, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980) (a bill to permit telephone companies to engage in video programming);
Cable Competition Act, S. 1068, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (a bill to require
actions to improve competition in the delivery of television programming, to
prohibit discrimination by cable programmers, and to permit telephone companies
to provide video programming); and The Cable Competition Act, H.R. 2437,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (a bill to require actions to improve competition in
the delivery of television programming, to prohibit discrimination by cable
programmers, and to permit telephone companies to provide video programming).
88. Nolan Bowie, Equity and Access in Information Technology, ANN. REV.
OF INST. FOR INFO. STUDIES 131 (1990) (proposing that an equitable information
policy be established which assures access to enhanced technologies and services
as they become indispensable to the information society); Angela J. Campbell,
Publish or Carriage: Approaches to Analyzing the First Amendment Rights of
Telephone Companies, 70 N.C. L. Rnv. 1071 (1992) (anticipating and addressing
arguments regarding the speech rights of local telephone network owners which
were subsequently raised by the government in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Company v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (9th Cir. 1994)); Mark S. Nadel, A Tech-
nology Transparent Theory of the First Amendment and Access to Communi-
cations Media, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 157 (1991) (proposing that where access to
networks is limited or non-existent, the First Amendment should allow the
government to provide for access, and conversely, where access to networks is
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tended to focus upon market entry and competition issues, they
have also raised concerns about the future scope of electronic
speech on the merging networks. Only recently, however, has
Congress acknowledged the importance of assuring all Americans
access to the merging networks to ensure opportunities for speech
and speech-related activities. 9
reasonably affordable, the government should not be permitted to impose access
obligations); Eli Noam, The Superstructure of Infrastructure: Thinking About a
Future Without a Public Network, or Principles for the Communications Act of
2034, Presented to the National Regulatory Research Institute (Oct. 22, 1991)
(proposing that basic concepts of common carriage, interconnectivity and access
provide the basis for development of future network infrastructure with the
government acting as the integrator of the infrastructure) (source on file with
author); Don Oldenburg, The Law: Lost In Cyberspace, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
1991, at E5 (reporting on a proposal by Lawrence Tribe); Perritt, supra note 59,
at 131 (proposing that an appropriate regulatory scheme for digital electronic
networks would be one in which networks exercising a high degree of control
over access would experience higher degrees of tort liability while entities
operating as common carriers would experience less or no tort liability for
carriage of information); Pamela Samuelson, First Amendment Rights for
Information Providers, COMM. OF THB ACM, June 1991, at 19 (proposing that
RBOCs be allowed to participate in the information services market as speakers
and common carriers subject to regulation by the FCC to preclude anti-competi-
tive activity); Hammond, Regulating Broadband, supra note 31; Laurence H.
Winer, Telephone Companies Have First Amendment Rights Too: The Constitu-
tional Case for Entry Into Cable, 8 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 257 (1990).
89. Most recently, the House and Senate passed bills intended to revise the
regulation of the telecommunications and cable television industries. This
acknowledges that American society's access to a switched, digital telecommuni-
cations service would promote the core First Amendment goal of diverse
information sources by "allow[ing] each individual the opportunity to contribute
to the free flow of ideas and information through telecommunications services."
See Communications Act of 1994, S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
Prior to Senate Bill 1822, Congress had addressed the scope of a multi-channel
network owner's speech rights in relation to those of its affiliated and non-
affiliated users on several occassions. See Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, P.L. 102-385 [S.12], §§ 4, 5, 9 (1992) (amending
47 U.S.C. §§ 533 and 531, requiring cable operators of a particular size to carry
a number of commercial and non-commercial local broadcast signals and
amending 47 U.S.C. § 532, requiring cable operators to provide opportunities for
non-affiliated programmers to leased access, respectively).
The National Communications Competition and Information Infrastructure
Reform Act, House Bill 3636, would have allowed local telephone companies to
provide video service and cable television companies to provide telephone service
in their respective markets. If enacted into law, telephone companies would have
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In recent draft legislation, Congress appears to contemplate a
merging industry composed of telecommunications firms and cable
television firms, among others.90 Cable companies have not
gained the ability to provide as well as transmit video programming. As a
consequence, they would have become speakers and editors as well as carrers.
The bill also would have required that telephone companies create a separate
subsidiary, with separate books, to offer cable services. See Provisions Contained
in House Legislation H.R. 3626, H.R. 3636, WASH. TELECOM NEws, July 4, 1994;
Major Telecommunications Reform Bills Overwhelmingly Pass in House, DAILY
REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, June 29, 1994, at d35.
90. See Antitrust Reform and Communications Act of 1994, H.R. 3626, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Communications Act of 1994, S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994).
Many members of the 103d and 104th Congresses concurred that there is a
need to reform the nation's 60-year-old telecommunications law and that the rules
limiting competition in the converging worlds of telecommunications, entertain-
ment, and information must be reformed. See Catherine Arnst, I-Way Tie-Up on
Capitol Hill, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 146; Major Telecommunications
Reform Bills Overwhelmingly Pass in House, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, June
29, 1994, at d35.
The "Pressler Bill," also known as the Telecommunications Competition and
Deregulation Act of 1995, recently was introduced during the 104th Congress.
If enacted in its present form, the Pressler Bill would, among other things, remove
all cable and telephone company cross-ownership restrictions within one year and
eliminate cable rate regulation. However, the current mood on Capitol Hill is said
to be so intensely partisan that Congress' ability to achieve bill passage by
Senator Pressler's predicted date of July 4, 1995, is in doubt. See Arnst, supra,
at 146; Sen. Pressler Releases Draft of Telecommunications Legislation, DAILY
REP. FOR EXEcUTIVES, Feb. 2, 1995, at d44.
One of the major areas of disagreement between Republican and Democrat
approaches to any communications legislation concerns the timing on market
entry. Last year's Senate Bill 1822, the Communications Act of 1994 Telecom-
munications Equipment Research and Manufacturing Competition Act of 1994,
if it had been enacted, would have opened local calling to competition immediate-
ly, while keeping the RBOCs out of the long distance and cable television markets
until there was some measurable erosion of their local monopolies. The RBOCs
and many Republicans favor a "date certain" concept after which the RBOCs
would be free to enter unregulated industries, regardless of the extent of local
competition. Democrats remain concerned that setting an arbitrary date would
allow the RBOCs to use their monopoly power in anti-competitive ways. See
Arnst, supra, at 146; Pressler, Fields Outline New Communications Bill to
Governors, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Jan. 31, 1995, at d44.
Similarly, Title 11 of House Bill 3636, The National Communication Competi-
tion and Information Infrastructure Act of 1994, would have allowed local
telephone companies to provide cable television service directly to their service
area subscribers provided the video programming is supplied through a separate
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responded favorably to the current draft of the most recent
legislation.9 The legislation reflects Congress' assumption that
video programming affiliate having separate books, records and accounts. It also
required telephone companies having video programming affiliates to establish a
video platform and to provide capacity for unaffiliated video program providers.
Finally, it also would have prohibited a common carrier from buying out a cable
system located within its telephone exchange area and owned by an unaffiliated
person. See Kate Maddox, Cable, Telcos Weigh Telecommunications Bills, ELEC.
MEDIA, Apr. 4, 1994, at 3.
In Title V of Senate Bill 1822, the Senate sought to establish the rules for
assuring regulatory parity between telephone and cable companies. The bill
would have prohibited carriers from providing video programming (cable) directly
to subscribers in their telephone exchange service area unless the programming
would be provided through a separate subsidiary, and the carrier was certified to
be in compliance with other relevant safeguard provisions of the bill. Cable
companies entering the telephone market were to be regulated in the same manner
as the common carriers with whom they sought to compete. The bill would have
prohibited local exchange common carriers from providing video programming
by acquiring the cable system providing such service within the carrier's
telephone exchange service area or via a joint venture with the cable local system
or systems.
91. The cable industry has not enthusiatically supported the Pressler draft
legislation because it would allow the RBOCs to compete against cable one year
after enactment. See Industry, Consumer Groups React to Draft Telecommunica-
tions Bill, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcurivEs, Feb. 3, 1995, at d31. The cable industry
would prefer that local phone companies not be allowed to compete in cable
markets until phone companies permit cable operators to interconnect with the
telephone companies' networks. Id. For a discussion on the considerations
attending cable entry into telephony, see Larry J. Yokell, Cable TV Moves into
Telecom Markets, Bus. COMM. REv., Nov. 1994, at 43.
Cable operators are particularly concerned that Congress will act in light of
recent cases which declare the telco-cable cross-ownership provision unconstitu-
tional. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909
(E.D. Va. 1993), aft'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994); US West, Inc. v. United
States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994), affd, No. 36775, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 39121 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1995); GTE California, Inc. v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940
(9th Cir. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill.
1994); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); see
also, USTA, OPATSCO, NTCA Win Lawsuit to Lift Cable-Phone Ownership Ban,
BNA MGMT. BRIEFING, Jan. 30, 1995, at d3. Representatives of the cable
industry argue that the court rulings have opened their industry to competition
from telephone companies, while various state and local regulations preclude cable
companies from entering the local telephone market. See Industry, Consumer
Groups React to Draft Telecommunications Bill, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES,
Feb. 3, 1995, at d31.
Another critical issue is the manner of telephone company entry into the video
market. For example, would they enter as additional competitors or merg-
1995]
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telecommunications firms will enter the market for the provision of
information, electronic publishing and video distribution services,
and that cable television firms will enter the market for the
provision of telecommunications services. This assumption is
supported by recent developments in the industry. 2
"Local" firms in both the telecommunications and cable
industries are perceived as possessing bottleneck control over
access by their subscribers, as well as the ability to engage in anti-
competitive activities. For instance, telephone firms are believed
to possess the means and the incentive to engage in anti-competi-
ing/acquiring partners? At least one major consumer organization, the Consumer
Federation of America, is concerned that the proposed legislation would allow
telephone companies to buy out the cable operators in the telcos' region and
thereby defeat competition by eliminating the most likely facilities-based
competitor. See Industry, Consumer Groups React to Draft Telecommunications
Bill, DAILY REP. FOR ExECUTIVES, Feb. 3, 1995, at d31.
92. Alan Deutschman & Joyce E. Davis, The Next Big Info Tech Battle,
FORTUNE, Nov. 29, 1993, at 39; Editorial Policing the Information Highway,
Cm. TRI., Nov. 26, 1993, at 30; John Huey et al., What That Merger Means for
You, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1993, at 82; Jolie Solomon et al., Big Brother's
Holding Company, NEWSWK., Oct. 25, 1993, at 38; John Greenwald et al.,
WIRED! Bell Atlantic's Bid for Cable Giant TCI Is the Biggest Media Deal in
History; It's Also a Peek at the Future, TIME, Oct. 25, 1993, at 50; Sandra
Sugawara & Paul Farhi, Merger to Create a Media Giant: $26 Billion Bell
Atlantic-TCI Deal Is a Vision of TV's Future, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1993, at Al;
Jube Shiver & Carla Lazzareschi, Bell Atlantic and TCI Need Federal Approval
to Merge; But Outdated Rules May Leave the Government Overmatched for the
Fight, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1993, at Dl; James Gleick, The Telephone
Transformed - Into Almost Everything, Cm. TRIB., June 19, 1994, (business) at
1; Michael Amdt, Technological Torrent Shorts FCC Circuitry, N.Y. TIMs, Feb.
25, 1994, at D4; Edmund L. Andrews, Collapse of a Giant Deal; Rising Doubts
on a Price Finally Killed a Merger, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 27, 1993, at 1; Aaron
Zitner, 10 Years Later, Bell Breakup's Impact Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1993,
at Al; Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Ready to Ease Its Legal Barriers in Communi-
cations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1993, at DI; Peter Passell, A Satisfactory
Marriage: Many Economists See Boon to Competition In Merger of Cable and
Phone Companies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1993, at Dl; Jube Shiver, Jr. & Carla
Lazzareschi, Regulators Slow to Catch Up With New Technology Telecommunica-
tions: Bell Atlantic and TCI Need Federal Approval to Merge; But Outdated Rules
May Leave the Government Overmatched for the Fight, L.A. TIMES, July 23,
1990, at A18; Thomas B. Rosenstiel, Information Age May Hinge on Cable TV
Regulation, C-u. TRIB., May 17, 1987, at (Sunday Mag.) 22; Kenneth R. Clark,
Network Woes Taken Over, Downsized, TV's Big Three Fight for Survival in a
Jungle of Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1984, at Al.
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ive activities once they enter the market for the provision of
information, electronic publishing and video services. Conse-
quently, structural safeguards would be imposed to reduce the
likelihood of such behavior.93 While both local telephone and
cable networks are subject to increasing competition, it has not
been deemed sufficient to allow market entry without regulation.
Therefore, limitations have been placed upon the ability of
telecommunications and cable firms to: acquire corresponding local
cable or telephone competitors;94 use monies generated in their
primary line of business to underwrite the competitive provision of
service in another; use facilities engaged in the provision of their
primary line of business to engage in the competitive provision of
service in another; use capacity they develop for the provision of
information, electronic publishing or video services to the exclusion
of others;95 and control the ability of their competitors to compete
efficiently by limiting their efficient use of the telephone or cable
system network to provide service based on cost or network
provisioning.
Collectively, the bills reflect Congress' expectation that the
provision of affordable telecommunications services via a multi-
functional telecommunications network will promote diversity by
creating opportunities for the free flow of ideas.96 Affordable
access is to be assured by the creation of a new universal access
policy with need-based subsidies for those unable to pay the full
cost of access;97 establishment of preferential rates for educational,
health care provider, government, public broadcaster and library ac-
cess; 98 and the development of network "gateways"99 and "plat-
forms" for information and video program providers who do not
93. See S. 1822; H.R. 3626.
94. See supra notes 89-90.
95. See H.R. 3626.
96. See S. 1822.
97. Id.
98. Id
99. See Matt Davis, How Will Cable Companies Deliver Telephone Service,
TELEPHONY, Nov. 28, 1994, at 54; Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee Report on S. 1822, DAiLY REP. FOR ExEcursV s, Sept. 20, 1994, at
d96; Lois F. Lunin, The Information Superhighway: Of the People, By the People,
But... For the People?, INFO. TODAY, Apr. 1994, at 49.
19951
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own network facilities but have legitimate reasons for requesting
access to network facilities.
The bills attempted to lay a foundation for an environment in
which network owners, users and subscribers would have afford-
able and technically efficient access to the merging and merged
telecommunications and cable television networks. The bills'
affirmative requirement that network users and subscribers be
granted access is justified as pro-competitive market regulation or
as a quid pro quo for the network owners' use of terrestrial public
rights of way and/or spectrum."°
Such access is based largely on economic criteria. To the extent.
that a network owner enjoys market power, it can be compelled to
generate excess transmission capacity or set aside a portion of its
transmission capacity to provide access. If the network owner does
not possess market power, it is assumed that a competitive
marketplace will facilitate the provision of access based upon
consumer demand. To the extent that the marketplace fails to
assure access, targeted subsidies, preferential rates and ownership
enhancements for historically disenfranchised groups presumably
will ensure that potential subscribers and socially valued speakers
receive access. If these bills had become law, user and subscriber
access would have become a statutory right. The strength of the
right would have been dependent upon the relative market power
of the network owners, the disposable wealth of potential users
requesting the service, the desirability of such users as a market,
and the ability of politically appointed bodies of state and federal
regulators to establish, subsidize and enforce minimum access for
those having little political power, or little desirability as a market,
or both.
Pursuant to other provisions of the bills, access requirements for
some groups are premised upon the network owners' use of public
rights of way and/or spectrum. Unlike prior iterations of the
"public rights of way" justification, there is no stated acknowl-
edgement of a nexus between the existence of economic or
100. See S. 1822.
HeinOnline  -- 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 40 1995
MULTI-MEDIA CHIMERA
technical scarcity and the use of public rights of way. 1'
In their current form, the bills adopt significant portions of the
status quo which exists in the separate regulatory schemes
allocating access rights in telecommunications and cable. In both,
the requirement to provide access is premised on the local network
owner's use of public rights of way and/or triggered by the
existence of market power resting upon technical and economic
scarcity. In the common carriage scheme, access is assured by a
policy of universal service which encourages subsidization of costs
for the provision of service to some subscribers, and a requirement
to provide nondiscriminatory access and service to like situated
subscribers."2 In the cable regulatory scheme, access is assured
for public, educational and governmental entities, as well as local
broadcasters. Opportunities for access are also made available to
unaffiliated programmers through the leased access rules." 3
The incremental innovation in the bills is the active melding of
the regulatory structures to facilitate the increasing convergence of
network technologies and functions while fostering competition
between the multi-functional networks that will evolve from
telecommunications and cable firms. As envisioned by Congress,
the regulatory environment of the merging firms is one in which
firms providing telecommunications services are regulated as
common carriers and firms providing video services are regulated
as cable operators. As telecommunications and cable firms are not
precluded from providing either telecommunications or video
services or both, some firms would ultimately be subject to both
common carrier and cable regulation. Firms seeking to provide
electronic publishing or information services would do so under the
101. At best, it may be implied by the fact that in significant part, access is a
function of market power which in both telecommunications and cable television
is a function of bottleneck control over access to facilities as a technical and
economic reality.
102. See Warren G. Lavey, Universal Telecommunications Infrastructure for
Information Services, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 151, 168 (1990); Philip H. Miller, New
Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First Amendment Status of Electronic
Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 1147, 1159-64 (1990).
103. See Regulating Broadband, supra note 31, at 207; R. Clark Wadlow &
Linda M. Wellstein, The Changing Regulatory Terrain of Cable Television, 35
CATH. U.L. REv. 705, 715-18 (1986).
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same regulatory regime regardless of evolutionary origin. The bills
do not take the final step of establishing a single environment
(whether regulatory or laissez faire) in which all firms would
compete to provide any and/or all services. Rather, the manage-
ment of the evolution to such an environment is to be delegated to
the FCC and to the states' °4
The drafters of House Bill 3626 and Senate Bill 1822 focused
upon maximizing access within a competitive market framework.
The government would no longer prohibit network owners from
using their network assets to communicate (i.e., to enter new
markets for the transmission and dissemination of information), but
would seek to restrict the owners' exercise of bottleneck control
over access to the network and the market. This would be
accomplished by: restricting the ability of local telephone and cable
firms to merge, thereby consolidating bottleneck control; requiring
local telephone and cable firms to compete in new markets through
a separate subsidiary to limit their ability to engage in unfair
competition via cross-subsidization or exclusive use of superior
facilities; and requiring access to be provided at non-discriminatory
prices. Finally, subscriber access would be maximized through a
universal service policy with targeted subsidies for those unable to
pay the going rate underwritten by all participating carriers."° In
this way, opportunities for electronic speech would be maximized.
While the proposed legislation established the opportunity to
engage in electronic speech as a statutory goal, it did not elevate
the opportunity to a constitutional right. Also, while it alluded to
104. See H.R. 3626; S. 1822.
105. See discussion of Pressler Bill, supra note 90. The proposals introduced
in Congress did not fully embrace the goals and policies of the Clinton
Administration, which recommended that telephone and cable companies be
deregulated and allowed to compete if they opened their networks to all
programmers and subscribers. Additionally, the Administration would have
prohibited cable firms from acquiring their local telephone companies or vice
versa. See Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, Gore Outlines Proposal to Create National
Information Highway: Laws Would Update Regulations, Standardize Technology,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 12, 1994, at Al; Bill Carter, Gore Outlines Data
Highway Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 12, 1994, at D5; cf Gore Alters Strategy for
Policy Bill: Will Seek to Amend House, Senate Vehicles, DAILY REP. FOR
ExEcurivEs, Feb. 10, 1994, at d37.
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a nexus between access, diversity and the free flow of ideas, it was
not explained. These shortcomings may have resulted from the
legislative process. Clearly, there are a number of unascertainable
or unknowable factors that led to the ultimate failure of the
bills."
Aside from recent legislation proposed in the 103rd and 104th
Congress, the government's efforts to address the scope of evolving
electronic speech rights have developed in a fragmented manner.
Access and speech rights are developed in the context of controver-
sies involving cable and telephone networks as they have arisen,
such as in must-carry, leased access or telco-cable cross-ownership
cases. 7 Consequently, the articulation of the electronic speech
rights of interactive broadband network owners and users has
occurred in a piecemeal fashion, leaving the scope of such rights
unresolved and some speech possibly unprotected."
As network functions, information streams, industries and
106. For example, the composition of both chambers was greatly affected by
the mid-term election and may have eroded support for the bills. See Industry
Resumes Talks with Senate on Telecomm Bill After Flare-Up, COMMON CARRIER
WK., Aug. 1, 1994; Kate Maddox, Cable, Telcos Weigh Telecommunications Bills,
ELEc. MEDIA, Apr. 4, 1994, at 3.
107. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994);
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993), affJd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
108. Two such areas are the current evolution of regulation of competition
within and between firms in the video distribution (cable television) and local
exchange (telecommunications) markets. As Congress and the FCC reimpose rate
regulation and access requirements on cable operators, the regulatory requirements
merge as the industries begin to merge. However, regardless of the growing
similarities between the two, cable regulation continues to concern only video firm
competition and consumer service within the video distribution market. Likewise,
telephone regulation concerns competition and access only in the local loop.
To the extent that individual states have addressed the issue at all, their efforts
have mirrored those of the administrative and legislative branches. They
recognize that opportunities for increased speech are a potential product of
building the electronic superhighway, but they have not sought as yet to define
just what the constitutional, statutory, or common law parameters of such rights
might be. See Renewing the Commitment to a Public Interest Telecommunications
Policy: Statement of Principles by the Telecommunications Policy Roundtable,
COMM. OF THE ACM, Jan. 1994, at 49; Lois F. Lunin, The Information
Superhighway: Of the People, By the People but ... for the People?, INFO.
TODAY, Apr. 1994, at 49.
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markets converge and realign, the relationship between network
owners and users realigns as well. The major components of this
realignment are: the transmission of information in a multi-media,
interactive, digital format; the existence of network owners which
are capable of becoming or are information providers; the existence
of information providers which do not own a network; and network
users which are capable of becoming or are information providers
as well. In short, the network transmission and information
functions merge as the potential opportunities for electronic speech
and speech activities expand.
Prior articulations of electronic speech rights on cable and
telephone networks provide some insight into the possible
apportionment of the speech rights of multi-media, broadband,
interactive network owners and network users, as well as non-
facilities-based information providers. Ultimately, however, the
regulatory paradigms may be of limited utility. As the transmis-
sion network functions and information streams merge, the criteria
upon which the regulatory and market distinctions are based
disappear, even as the number of potential speech rights claimants
grows and the claims grow more complex. Moreover, the levels
at which rights may be exercised increases. For example, potential
rights exist at the content level, at the level of access to the
network as it is configured by owners, and finally, at the level of
access to the means of reconfiguring the network to achieve
different distributions of information to different recipients.
This analysis is critical to an understanding of the relevance of
judicial precedent. It is also critical to an understanding of more
recent precedent, such as Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Company v. United States,"9 Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc.
v. United States," and the Advanced Intelligent Network pro-
ceeding at the FCC;.. they are the legal manifestation of the
issues raised by the convergence of technology, markets and
information. Accompanied by companion legislation and evolving
109. 830 F. Supp. 909.
110. 114 S. Ct. 2445.
111. In re Intelligent Networks, 8 F.C.C.R. 6813 (1993).
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law in the area of indecency,"2 they will provide the basis for
much of the allocation of electronic speech rights in broadband
interactive networks.
III. CONVERGENCE AND THE REGULATION OF NETWORK
ACCESS IN CABLE AND TELEPHONY
A. Mergers and Challenges
Many industry observers expect the merger of local cable and
telephone industries and technologies to result in the development
of interactive, broadband, multimedia networks or, alternatively,
more multi-channel cable networks.13  If correct, judicial
pronouncements on the relative rights of telephone and cable
network owners to provide information over their networks and to
determine who may have access to their facilities are critical to the
evolution of access and speech rights on the merging infrastruc-
tures.
In regulations prohibiting local telco-cable cross-ownership," 4
112. See discussion infra parts III.B.2 and MI.C.
113. While some commentators question its advisability or necessity, cable
television and regional telephone firms have begun to merge as a strategy for
avoiding competition in existing markets and/or expanding into new markets. See
Andrew Kupfer, The Baby Bells Butt Heads, FORTUNE, Mar. 21, 1994, at 76;
Michael Botein, The AT&T-McCaw Merger: Needfor Analysis, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30,
1993, at 2; C. Edwin Baker, Tollbooths on the Information Superhighway, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993, at A21. Cable television firms have begun to enter the
local telephone markets while opposing the imposition of common carrier
regulation upon them. See Larry J. Yokell, Cable TV Moves into Telecom
Market, Bus. COMM. REv., Nov. 1994, at 43; Martyn F. Roetter, The Genie in the
Bottleneck, TE3PHONY, Oct. 10, 1994, at 30. Simultaneously, the regional
telephone companies have challenged the constitutionality of the telco-cable
crossownership restriction. See discussion infra part m.B.2. The restriction
prohibits their entry into the local video programming and distribution market
coinciding with their local service areas for provision of telephone service. Id.
114. The government's telco-cable cross-ownership restriction significantly
restricts local exchange carrier entry into the video distribution market as
programmers. In litigation challenging provisions of the 1984 Cable Act, the
issue has been the extent to which the government may, in the guise of economic
market regulation, require local telephone companies to extend access rights to
network users and information providers while forgoing access to exercise video
speech themselves. See discussion infra parts Im.B.2 and fII.C. The telephone
companies also face opposition to their entry into the electronic publishing market
1995]
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or requiring must-carry, "5 leased and PEG access channels,"
6
the government requires that network owners forego access to all
or a portion of their facilities to provide access to unaffiliated
information providers. The government argues that the cross-
ownership, must-carry and leased access regulations are justified as
necessary prophylactic economic prescriptions to avoid the
anticompetitive exercise of market power by telephone and cable
network owners. In addition, they are justified as structural rather
than content specific means to increase the diversity of speakers
having access to telephone and cable subscribers.
However, when market regulations restrict the economic
activities of industries engaged in creating, editing or distributing
information, they also impact the network owner's speech. The
local telephone companies argue that when they are prohibited
from providing video services in their subscription areas, they are
simultaneously prohibited from engaging in protected speech."7
Cable television companies argue that when they are required to
provide access to unaffiliated programmers, they must forego the
exercise of their editorial rights over a portion of their channel
capacity. The current resolution of these arguments is found in
several recent judicial opinions.
as publishers and the information services market as information providers.
Yokell, supra note 113, at 43. See John A. Farrell, Newspapers Roll Out
Lobbyists in Electronic Information Fight, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1991, at 5;
Kate Gerwig, The Beef of the Bills, COMM. WK., Dec. 20, 1993, at 5; Markey
Introduces Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill, COMMON CARRIER WK., Nov.
29, 1993.
115. The government requires cable operators of a certain size, to carry the
signals of competing broadcast licensees in the cable operator's market. In
litigation challenging the legislation, the key issue has been the extent to which
the government may constitutionally require that cable operators provide such
access to broadcast station competitors without the exercise of control over access
by the network provider. See discussion infra parts I1I.C and m.D.
116. The government requires cable network providers to cede a portion of
their channel capacity to public, educational, government or unaffiliated
information providers. As a result, the owners forego the exercise of control over
those channels in most instances. See discussion infra part HI.D; see also William
E. Lee, Cable Leased Access and the Conflict Among First Amendment Rights and
First Amendment Values, 35 EMORY L.J. 563, 564-66 (1986).
117. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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B. Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership: Constraining Network
Owner Market Entry and Access
1. A Brief History of Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership
Regulated telephone local exchange carriers (LECs) have been
prohibited from providing video distribution in their local markets
since 1970. At that time, the FCC issued a rule prohibiting a local
telephone company from owning a cable concern in the same
market."8 The rule was promulgated to prevent anti-competitive
118. Telephone companies were prohibited from providing video programming
"to the viewing public in [their respective] telephone service area[s], either
directly, or indirectly through an affiliate owned by... or under common control
with the telephone [company in question]." 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(a) (1993).
Moreover, telephone company provision of "channels of communications or pole
line conduit space, or other rental arrangements" to any affiliate seeking to
provide video programming to the public, was forbidden under § 63.54(b). An
affiliation was deemed to exist if there was any "financial or business relationship
whatsoever by contract or otherwise, directly or indirectly between the carrier and
the customer." § 63.54(c). The only exception to the prohibition, was the carrier-
user relationship whereby the carrier "indiscriminately held itself out to serve all
similarly situated customers under the same conditions of service." See id.
Consequently, a carrier was effectively precluded from establishing a unique
relationship with a potential provider of video service.
In 1981, the FCC reviewed its rules and established limited exemptions.
Telephone companies operating in rural areas with populations of less than 2,500
were exempted from compliance with the rule. 47 C.F.R. § 63.58(a). Also, the
rule could be waived if it could be established that cable service "demonstrably
could not exist except through a cable system owned by, operated by, controlled
by, or affiliated with the local telephone common carrier, or upon other showing
of good cause." 47 C.F.R. § 63.56(a). At the time the FCC promulgated its
exemptions, its Office of Plans and Policy (OPP) issued a report recommending
that the telco-cable cross-ownership restriction be maintained. In re Tel
Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.R. 5849,5850 (1988)
(citing OFFICE OF PLANS & POLICY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
FCC POLICY ON CABLE OWNERSmHP: A STAFF REPORT (Nov. 1981)). The OPP
suggested that the ban be retained because, in the pre-divestiture environment of
1981, regulated telephone companies could unfairly compete against other cable
market entrants. Id.
While the OPP found that some potential benefits such as joint efficiency of
operations and development of new technologies and services might accrue from
telco provision of cable service, it ultimately concluded the ban was appropriate.
Id. at 5871 n.18. The OPP reasoned that telephone firms would be able to
subsidize their cost of competing in the unregulated cable market with revenues
from their regulated telephone businesses. Additionally, they would be able to
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activities of LECs who sought to control the entry of cable into
their markets by restricting or controlling cable operator access to
telephone facilities and pole attachments." 9
In 1984, Congress codified the FCC's telco-cable cross-owner-
ship rules in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984."z
The legislative history of section 613(b) indicates that it was
intended to codify the then current FCC telco-cable cross-owner-
ship rules prohibiting telephone companies from directly providing
video programming to subscribers in their telephone markets.'"
The FCC subsequently reversed its earlier decision, and
concluded that the public interest would be better served by
partially lifting the cross-ownership ban."z The FCC concluded
forestall facilities-based competition from potential cable entrants because the
construction of competitive facilities would be a substantial economic bar to entry.
Finally, the telcos could control competitive entry by controlling competitors'
access to pole attachments. Id.
The OPP recommended that the telco-cable cross-ownership prohibition be
retained until competition existed in the local loop, equal access to poles and
attachments could be assured, and it became clear that cable would not compete
against telephone companies or that the ban hindered the development of new
technologies. Id. The OPP also concluded that if the telephone companies were
allowed to provide cable television service, the FCC lacked adequate regulatory
mechanisms to protect the market against the potential anti-competitive abuses
OPP had envisioned. Id
Efforts to have the rules repealed began immediately but were unsuccessful.
Aside from the exemptions for small rural communities or a narrowly defined
showing of good cause, the FCC refused to consider repeal of the rule. See In re
Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.R. 5849
(1988); In re Elimination of Telephone-Company Cable Television Cross-Owner-
ship Rules, 91 F.C.C.2d 622 (1982); In re Revision of the Processing Policies for
Waivers of Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 82
F.C.C.2d 254, 266-75 (1980) (Separate Statement of Commissioner Joseph R.
Fogarty).
119. See In re Applications of Telephone Common Carriers for Section 214
Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna
Television Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970), recon in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746
(1970), aft'd, General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
120. 47 U.S.C. § 613(b) (1984).
121. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4668; 130 CONG. REC. H 27978 (Oct. 1, 1984).
122. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules,
3 F.C.C.R. 5849 (1988); In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-
Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54 to 63.58, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781, at 1 21 & n.43
(1992) (second report and order, recommendation to Congress, and second further
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that, subject to safeguards, the public would receive significant
benefits if telephone companies were allowed to provide cable
television service. It tentatively concluded that construction and
operation of technologically advanced, integrated broadband
networks by carriers for the purpose of providing video program-
ming and other services would constitute good cause for a waiver
of the prohibition."2
2. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. United States
Despite the FCC's reversal, Congress did not repeal its law
prohibiting telco companies from providing video programming to
subscribers in their areas. In response, Bell Atlantic filed suit
alleging that the 1984 Cable Act prohibition violated its First and
Fifth Amendment rights, as well as the First Amendment rights of
subscribers." Bell Atlantic argued that video programming is a
notice of proposed rulemaking).
123. Id. at 5870 n.6 (1988) (citing 69 F.C.C.2d 1110). However, because
Congress had codified the prohibition into law, the FCC alone could not
implement its proposed change in policy. Instead, it solicited comments to assist
it in developing a record which might persuade Congress to repeal the codified
prohibition.
The FCC's proposal was met with substantial opposition from newspapers,
broadcasters and cable operators, as well as members of Congress. Moreover, the
proposal was formed at a time when the Commission's proposed Computer III
structural safeguards were under severe judicial and public criticism. In addition,
congressional and public focuses had shifted away from a marketplace solution
for the regulation of cable via telephone company provision of video program-
ming, to direct governmental regulation of cable television rates, access and
content. The Cable Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 1992
consequently failed to provide any relief from the 1984 Cable Act's prohibition.
Nevertheless, through aggressive use of its waiver policy and the issuance of
its video dialtone rulemaking, the FCC paved the way for limited RBOC entry
into the video distribution markets. See Farrell, supra note 114, at 5. These FCC
efforts also engendered substantial opposition. Yokell, supra note 113, at 43.
Further, the RBOCs themselves deemed the limited video dialtone entry proposed
by the FCC to be insufficient.
124. At least one scholar agrees with the telephone company's argument. See
Winer, supra note 88; cf Campbell, supra note 88.
The C&P suit is not the first effort undertaken by the RBOCs to defeat the
cross-ownership ban on constitutional grounds. Prior to the C&P lawsuit, the
government addressed the constitutionality of restricting telephone company
access to information markets in proceedings before a district court, Congress and
the FCC. The issue was first raised in court proceedings in 1982 and in 1987.
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In the 1982 proceeding, district court Judge Harold Green issued an order
approving an agreement between AT&T and the Department of Justice precluding
the soon-to-be divested RBOCs from entering the information services market as
"electronic publishers." See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 227
(D.D.C. 1982), affid sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
There were two stated rationales for the prohibition. First, absent the
prohibition, the RBOCs would use the monopoly control of their facilities in anti-
competitive ways which would impede the development of the nascent electronic
publishing industry. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 181-82. Second, allowing RBOC
entry into the information services industry would have a detrimental effect on
First Amendment values because the RBOCs would, in pursuing their anticipated
economic aims, preclude other programmers from gaining comparable access to
RBOC facilities. Id. at 183.
In 1987, during the first triennial review of the decree, the Department of
Justice and the RBOCs recommended that the ban on entry into the information
services market be lifted because market conditions had changed significantly and
entry would have positive effects on the industry. 714 F. Supp. at 3. Further,
some RBOCs argued the ban should be removed because it infringed the RBOCs'
First Amendment rights. 673 F. Supp. at 586 n.273. In response, the court ruled
that the RBOCs could enter the information services market as transmission
providers, but not as information providers. 673 F. Supp. at 567. The informa-
tion services had to be owned by other non-affiliated firms. I. The court also
briefly addressed the RBOCs' First Amendment arguments and dismissed them
on several grounds. Id. at 585-86. First, the RBOCs, like other companies were
subject to antitrust regulations of which the consent decree restrictions are a part.
Id at 586 n.273. Second, because the RBOCs were common carriers, they
enjoyed a different status from other network providers which retained speech
rights. Id. Third, there was in fact no infringement of RBOC speech rights
because, upon the proper showing, the previously agreed upon ban could be lifted.
Id On appeal, the court of appeals did not reach the First Amendment issue. 900
F.2d 283 at 299-300. However, on remand, the district court reluctantly removed
the restriction. 767 F. Supp. 308, 327. Upon RBOC appeal of the court's
decision, the court of appeals ruled that the lower court could not require the
RBOCs to establish that market conditions had changed given the fact that no
party to the consent decree had challenged the assertion. 900 F.2d at 305-07.
Further, the district court was required to apply a different standard to assess the
advisability of removing the restrictions, as the parties recommended. Id. Faced
with the change in standard, the district court felt compelled, albeit reluctantly,
to lift the ban. 767 F. Supp. 308, 327-332.
From 1988 to 1992, the RBOCs also sought relief from the cross-ownership ban
through a variety of bills proposing to allow telephone company entry into the
video transmission and provision market. See H.R. 1504, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); S. 1200, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2546, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (companion legislation to H.R. 2546); S. 2800, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990); S. 1068, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 2437 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) (companion legislation to Senate Bill 1068). However, the telco provision
of video programming, which was seen as an alternative to re-regulation of cable
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form of constitutionally protected speech which it is not allowed to
present on its own network."z According to the carrier, based on
the statutory definition of video programming, the 1984 Cable Act
prohibition directly infringes Bell Atlantic's First Amendment
rights because it prohibits the company and its subsidiaries from
engaging in video speech."
television rates and practices, was not adopted by Congress despite significant
support from the then president. Instead, the cable industry was substantially re-
regulated. In 1993, Senate Bill 1504 proposed to remove the cross ownership
restriction. Yet, in all the legislation which has addressed the issue of telco
ownership of video distribution facilities, and despite efforts by telephone
companies to raise the constitutional speech issue before the FCC and the MFJ
court, to date, there are only two references to telephone company First
Amendment speech issues in previously unsuccessful legislation. See H.R. REP.
No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655,4668
(citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)) (explaining the
relationship between the telephone-cable cross-ownership prohibition and the First
Amendment goal of diversity of ownership and viewpoint). See also S. 1200,
Communication Competition and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991,
§ 101(14), which states, "[t]he Congress makes the following findings: (14) A
broadband communications infrastructure will be every American's tool of
personal emancipation; will generate a quantum increase in Americans' freedom
of speech." Id.
The issue was addressed a second time when Congress determined that its
codification of the FCC's telephone-cable television cross-ownership rules was
constitutional. Finally, the issue was addressed in the context of FCC delibera-
tions concerning its telephone company-cable television cross-ownership
restriction.
Collectively, in these proceedings, the government has set forth its rationale for
why its decision to continue the imposition of the restriction on local telephone
company provision of video programming is constitutional. See In re Telephone
Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.R. 5849 (1988).
125. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief [hereinafter Bell Complaint], at 5 113;
see also Bell Atlantic Challenges Cable Act in U.S. District Court, TELEPHONE
NEWs, Jan. 11, 1993.
126. Bell Complaint, supra note 125, at 5 16; see also Judge Examines Telco
Claims to First Amendment Cable Rights, COMMON CARRIER WK., June 21, 1993,
at 3. In its Complaint, Bell Atlantic alleged that under sections 522(16) and
533(b) of the Act:
Congress has required government officials to decide whether telephone
companies are providing prohibited speech that is 'generally
considered comparable to' television programming or whether they are
providing non-prohibited speech which may also involve video images.
This... process... involves an evaluation of the video images and the
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In retort, the government argued that the ban does not violate
C&P Telephone's First Amendment rights and thus does not
require heightened scrutiny for several reasons. First, C&P
Telephone, as a common carrier, is treated differently from other
information distributors under the First Amendment."' Second,
the ban is an antitrust prohibition similar to those to which other
media companies are subject."2 Third, the ban is a content-
neutral restriction incidentally affecting speech."2  Finally, the
ban is narrowly tailored to meet the substantial government
interests in preventing anti-competitive abuses by telephone carriers
possessing monopoly power and maintaining a competitive
environment for broadband communications."0
Judge Ellis, writing for the court, held that the congressional
prohibition against telco provision of video services was unconsti-
tutional. 3 ' He opined that the availability of workable regulatory
alternatives which do not deny local video speech to the entire
class of telephone company speakers rendered the prohibition
overbroad.'32
The court rejected the government's "common carriage argu-
context in which they are presented; a consideration of the impact such
video images will have upon the viewer; and a determination whether
such video images will be perceived by the general public as a
substitute for the forms of video speech that have been provided by
others over traditional cable and broadcasting facilities.
Bell Complaint, supra note 125, at 5-6 116.
Consequently, Bell Atlantic is not allowed to reach its customers through its
own video or video-on-demand programming. Id. at 6 18. Further, the company
argues that the statute does not serve a "compelling," "substantial" or "important"
government interest. Id. at 6 20. In any event, the carrier argues that the
underlying goal of the legislation has not been achieved because a local monopoly
in video transmission developed despite the statute. Id. at 7 22. Finally, the
economic rationale for the statutory prohibition is argued to be vague and
prophylactic because it seeks to protect against future hypothetical abuses which
the telephone companies might perpetrate. Id
127. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 918-
19 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
128. Id at 920-21.
129. Id. at 922-23.
130. Id at 930.
131. Id at 932.
132. Id. at 931-32.
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ment" as unpersuasive because the ban "directly abridge[d] [C&P
Telephone's] right to express ideas" via video communication.'"
Furthermore, despite the ban's primary economic regulatory thrust,
its incidental impact on speech falls disproportionately on C&P
Telephone's ability to engage in protected speech. Finally, the
court found that the government's reliance on the ban's status as
an economic regulation was misplaced because the ban's impact
was deemed significant and proportional.'35 The fact that the ban
prohibited a specific class of speakers from engaging in protected
speech was sufficient to warrant heightened constitutional analy-
sis. 36  Relying on precedent, the court concluded that an
intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate.37 The court
133. Id. at 918.
134. See id. at 921-22.
135. Id.
136. Id at 921.
137. Id. at 926. The court distinguished the judicial precedents upon which the
government relied. Id. at 919. It found that the broadcast regulation precedents
employing a rational basis test were inapposite because they are premised upon
the scarcity of available spectrum frequencies. Id. No such scarcity of
frequencies was at issue in C&P. Idt Based on its rather broad reading of Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), it also concluded that the
existence of economic scarcity in cable television markets did not provide a
justification for the application of the rational basis test. Id.
The government's argument that its regulation of C&P Telephone's video
speech rights was a "quid pro quo" for its enjoyment of monopoly status was
dismissed as well. Id. at 921. According to the court, the argument was
unavailing because the states rather than the federal government extended
monopoly status to telephone companies such as C&P Telephone. Id. at 920.
Finally, the government's reliance on Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1 (1945), for the proposition that antitrust (and hence economic regulation) should
be subject to rationality review, was deemed misplaced. Id. at 921. The court
found that the cross-ownership provision had a significant and disproportionate
impact on C&P Telephone's speech. Id. at 921-22. According to the court, the
Supreme Court has never held that rationality review could be employed where
structural economic regulation prohibited a specific class of speakers from
engaging in protected speech. Id
The court also concluded that strict scrutiny analysis was inapplicable. It found
that while the statute proscribed the protected speech of a particular class of
speakers, strict scrutiny was not required unless the prohibition was also content-
based. Id. at 923 n.20 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 452 (1991) and
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), 114 S. Ct.
2445 (1994)). By implication, the court reasoned that the statute was not content-
based. Yet several pages later, the court conceded that the application of the
19951
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determined that the statute would withstand constitutional scrutiny
if it was "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leaves ample alternatives for the communication of
information. '""
Analyzing the merits of the government's asserted interests of
promoting competition and diversity, the court concluded that the
government's use of the ban to promote competition in the video
programming market was counterproductive.'39 Rather than
promote competition, the prohibition against the entry of telephone
competitors into the multi-channel video distribution market
actually limited competition. 40
On the other hand, the government's interest in preserving
diversity in the ownership of communications media was deemed
significant.' 4' However, the government's use of a flat market
entry ban to protect against anti-competitive activity by C&P
Telephone was held to be overly restrictive in light of alternative
regulatory solutions and Congress' silence on the potential
effectiveness of the ban.142 Furthermore, the court concluded that
statute "depends on the content of the telephone companies' proposed message."
Id. at 924. Its justification for the apparent inconsistency was that pursuant to its
reluctant reliance on Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) and
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), "[g]overnment regulation
... is content neutral [and therefore not subject to strict scrutiny] so long as it is
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech." C&P, 830 F.
Supp. at 924 (alterations in original). Because the government justified the cross-
ownership restriction on economic grounds alone, the court felt compelled to
conclude that the statute was justified without regard to its impact on the content
of regulated speech. Id. at 924, 926.
138. Id at 917 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789-90
(1989)).
139. Id. at 927.
140. Id. The court concluded that the prohibition precluded the potential entry
of the telephone companies, one of the potentially more viable multi-channel
competitors to cable operators. As a consequence, it limited rather than enhanced
diversity by limiting competition. Id.
141. Id. at 928.
142. Id. at 929. The statute's original goal was to preclude telephone
companies such as C&P Telephone from refusing cable companies access to
telephone poles for the purpose of stringing cable, and engaging in the cross-
subsidization of its forays into video programming and distribution with monies
garnered from its provision of monopoly telephone service. Id. In adopting the
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the "ban does not fit with [the government's] asserted justifica-
tion."'43  The court also held that the statute was not narrowly
tailored because the existence of effective alternatives allowed
telephone entry into the video programming market while prevent-
ing telephone company attempts at monopolization." Instead,
the statute burdens more speech than is necessary. 4
C. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC Constraining
Network Owner Control of Market Entry and Access
The recent cable industry challenge to federal must-carry, leased
access and PEG provisions in the 1992 Cable Act again raised the
issue of the appropriate level of First Amendment protection
enjoyed by cable providers. This determination not only affects the
relationship between cable operators, information providers and
users; it also impacts the potential relationship between network
owners and users of multi-media broadband networks.
Sections 4 and 5 of the Act require cable systems of a certain
size to carry, upon broadcaster request, the signals of certain
licensed commercial and non-commercial broadcast stations in the
cable operator's market.' 47 Several cable operators challenged the
FCC's cross-ownership prohibition, Congress made no findings as to the
effectiveness of less restrictive regulatory alternatives. Id.
143. Id. The court reasoned that the statute prohibits telephone companies
from providing video programming to subscribers in their service areas but does
not preclude them from transporting video programming. Id. However, the
government's alleged justification for the ban is the prevention of telephone
companies such as C&P from engaging in discriminatory pole access and cross-
subsidization in the video distribution [transport] market. Id. Nevertheless, under
existing law, telephone companies could possibly secure supra-competitive prices
via cross-subsidization in the transport market despite the ban. Id. at 930.
Consequently, the government was left with the argument that the ban was
necessary to preclude telephone company attempts to monopolize the video
program market. Id. at 930-31. This argument failed for lack of evidence and
persuasiveness that other effective methods of regulating anticompetitive activity
in the video program market are unavailable. Id. at 930.
144. Id. at 931-32.
145. Id.
146. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
147. Id at 2453-54 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 534(b)(1)(B), requiring cable
systems with more than 12 active channels to set aside one third of their channel
capacities for commercial broadcasters requesting carriage; 534(b)(1)(A), requiring
19951
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constitutionality of the statute's provisions alleging that they
violated the cable operators' First Amendment rights in three
ways."' First, they argued that the provisions inhibit cable
operators' editorial discretion to choose what video programming
to carry.'49 Second, the provisions force cable operators to
devote a portion of their finite channel capacities to other speaker-
competitors."5  Third, they argued that these provisions are
content-based restrictions favoring broadcasters over cable
programmers and, in fact, discriminate against cable system own-
ers.'51
The government responded that Congress implemented the
provisions because cable systems possess excessive market power
harmful to broadcast competitors. 52 Mandatory carriage was
designed to eliminate anti-competitive cable practices, preserve
public access to over-the-air television broadcasting signals and
ensure public access to diverse video prograuning."3  The
provisions were touted as content-neutral, industry-specific
legislation."
1. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC"
The district court panel's ruled two-to-one upholding the
constitutionality of the provisions. The court stated that the
cable systems with more than 300 subscribers but 12 or fewer active channels to
carry signals of three commercial broadcasters; and 535(a), requiring carriage of
public broadcast stations).
148. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 38 (D.D.C.
1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
149. Id.
150. Id. See also Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 18
(D.D.C. 1993) (holding that §§ 612(b) and 611 of the 1992 Cable Act prohibit
cable operators from exercising editorial control over its lessee's programming).
151. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 38.
152. Id. at 40.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993),
vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
156. The 1992 Cable Act provides that all challenges to must-carry provisions
must be made to a three-judge panel of the District Court of the District of
Columbia. 47 U.S.C. § 555 (Supp. IV 1992). Appeals from three-judge panels
are taken directly to the Supreme Court. § 635(c)(1)-(2).
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provisions are "essentially economic regulations designed to create
competitive balance in the video industry as a whole, and to
redress the effects of cable operators' anti-competitive practic-
es. ' ,7To the extent the First Amendment is implicated at all, it
is a mere byproduct of the fact that cable operators transmit video
signals to communicate information." As such, the must-carry
provisions are "unrelated ... to the content of any messages that
these embattled cable operators, broadcasters and programmers
have in contemplation to deliver." '59
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling." A
majority of the Court found that the government's interests in
promoting diversity of information from competing sources,
157. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 40. The Senate reached the same conclusions.
It viewed the signal carriage provisions as "economic regulations" intended to
promote competition between broadcast and cable distribution systems and
enhance viewpoint diversity available to cabled and non-cabled homes. S. REP.
No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133,
1188. According to the Senate, Congress enacted the regulations to ensure that
cable operators do not exercise control over their distribution facilities in a
manner which discriminates against broadcasters. Id. at 56, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1189. At least one legal scholar is skeptical of the court majority's holding
(and the Senate's conclusion) that the regulations have minimal impact upon
speech because they have been justified as economic regulation. Mark Peritz,
Turner Broadcasting v. FCC: A First Amendment Challenge to Cable Television
Must-Carry Rules, 3 WM. & MARY BIL OF RTs. J. 715 (1994).
158. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 40. The Senate stated that the signal carriage
provisions are "not at all based on the content of those signals, but instead...
counterbalance cable systems' commercial or economic incentives to exclude...
[broadcast] signals." S. REP. No. 92, supra note 158, at 56, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 89. The Senate made only an oblique acknowledgement of the possible
relevance of the First Amendment to cable operator speech rights, stating that:
"[t]he First Amendment also supports government regulations intended to promote
a diversity of voices, even if some incidental loss of editorial discretion results."
Id
159. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 40.
160. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). The
majority found that:
Congress designed the must-carry provisions not to promote speech of
a particular content, but to prevent cable operators from exploiting their
economic power to the detriment of broadcasters, and thereby to ensure
that all Americans, especially those unable to subscribe to cable, have
access to free television programming - whatever its content.
Id at 2462.
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preserving forty percent of the society's access to economically
viable broadcast stations, and promoting fair competition in the
video distribution market were important governmental inter-
ests."' However, the Court also stated that the government had
failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that broadcast
stations are in economic jeopardy and that the must-carry rules will
actually advance the government's interests by materially alleviat-
ing the economic harm.62 As a result, the Court remanded the
case back to the district court panel.
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that cable operators
engage in constitutionally protected speech activities.6 More
importantly, the Court distinguished between the First Amendment
regulation of cable television, and regulation of broadcast television
and newspapers."6
In response to the government's argument that the must-carry
provisions should be analyzed under the same standard of review
applied to broadcasting, a majority of eight justices held that
broadcasting precedents do not apply to cable television.' 5 The
majority looked to the technological differences between the
broadcasting and cable technologies in making a distinction
between the First Amendment standards to be applied to the two
industries."6 The Court reasoned that cable does not possess the
unique physical limitations of technical scarcity and interference
that broadcasting does."6  Additionally, the cable industry's
channel capacity is growing rapidly and speakers on adjacent cable
channels suffer no degradation of signal due to interference.'
61
Consequently, the more relaxed review standard applied to
government regulation of broadcast licensees does not apply to
cable. "
161. Id. at 2469-70.
162. Id at 2470.
163. See id. at 2456 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991)).
164. Id. at 2456-57.
165. Id. at 2456.
166. Id. at 2456-57.
167. Id. at 2457.
168. Id.
169. Id at 2457. The government also argued that the economic characteristics
of the broadcast market rather than its technical characteristics served as the basis
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Addressing the cable system operators and affiliated programm-
ers' arguments that strict scrutiny analysis should apply to the
must-carry provisions, a smaller majority of the Court determined
that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard of re-
view. 170 The majority reasoned that the requirement to carry a
number of full powered broadcast stations is content-neutral.
17
'
Signal carriage is solely a function of cable channel capacity.
Thus, a cable operator cannot "avoid or mitigate" its carriage
obligations by changing its programming. Finally, to the extent
that the must-carry rules distinguish between speakers, they do not
favor broadcast programmers over cable programmers on the basis
of their speech content, but rather by their form of transmis-
sion. I73  Because the rules do not evidence a governmental
for broadcast regulation and the same consideration of economic characteristics
should apply to cable regulation. Id. A majority of eight justices rejected that
argument for two reasons. First, it stated that the special technical characteristics
of broadcasting and not the economic characteristics are the basis of broadcast
jurisprudence. Id. Second, it emphasized that unsubstantiated assertions of
economic market dysfunction will not serve to shield speech regulation from the
First Amendment standards applicable to non-broadcast media. Id. at 2458.
A majority of eight justices also rejected the government's categorization of the
must-carry rules as industry-specific antitrust legislation deserving of rational basis
scrutiny. Id. The Court found that the government's reliance on Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) and on Lorrain Journal Co. v. U.S. 342
U.S. 143 (1951), was misplaced. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458. Whereas both cases
involved the actions against the press brought under a law of general application
to all industries, the must-carry provisions have singled out the cable industry for
special treatment. Id. Consequently, heightened First Amendment analysis was
warranted. Id.
170. Id. at 2469.
171. Id at 2460.
172. Id
173. Id. The majority found support for its conclusion that Congress based its
distinction between broadcast and cable speakers on the mode of transmission in
the statutory findings accompanying the provisions. Id. at 2461. According to
the majority's reading of the statutory findings, Congress made the distinction to
preclude cable operators from favoring their affiliated programmers over
broadcasters in an effort to garner a larger share of advertising revenues. Id.
Absent the provisions, Congress reasoned that cable operators would favor their
programmers to the severe economic disadvantage of broadcasters. Id. Such
economic detriment would result in the loss of free, over the air broadcasting to
the viewing public, especially the forty percent unable to afford access to cable
television. Id. Given the vital part television plays in our communications
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preference for one set of speakers over another based on the
content of their speech, strict scrutiny analysis was not triggered."
system, the provisions were necessary to ensure all Americans access to such
programming. Id.
In discussing the merits of broadcast television, Congress emphasized its
importance as a source of local news, public affairs and other programming
essential to an informed electorate, as well as educational and informational
programming. Id. at 2462. Cable system owners and programmers had seized
upon these statements as proof that Congress' provisions favored broadcasters
over cable operators and programmers on the basis of content. Id. According to
the Turner majority, Congressional statements merely constituted acknowledge-
ments of the valuable role broadcasting plays, and did not imply a comparative
valuation of broadcasting vis-a-vis cable. Consequently, the provisions are in fact
content-neutral. Id.
174. Id. at 2467. The majority dispensed with three other arguments in favor
of strict scrutiny analysis. The cable system operators and programmers argued
that the must-carry provisions: 1) compel cable system owners to transmit speech
they would not otherwise transmit; 2) favor broadcast programmers over cable
programmers; and 3) single out cable system owners for disfavored treatment. Id.
at 2464-67.
In response to the "compulsion" argument, the majority held that the must-carry
provisions are content-neutral and are not triggered by cable operator speech in
the way that access rules in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974) and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475
U.S. 1, 11 (1986) activated the requirement to provide access. Turner, 114 S. Ct.
at 2465. In light of cable operators' long history of carrying broadcast stations
without changing cable programming, the majority found no rational reason why
cable operators would now alter their programming in response to broadcast
station programming carried as a result of the must-carry provisions. Id. Finally,
the cable industry's reliance on Tornillo was misplaced, according to the majority,
because cable operators exercise far greater control over access to the relevant
medium than do print publishers. Print publishers do not control distribution;
thus, they cannot obstruct reader access to other publications. Id. at 2466.
In response to the "media favoritism" argument, the majority distinguished
between speaker-partial laws based on whether they actually reflect a government
preference for the content of one speaker's speech over another's. Id. at 2467.
The majority found that the must-carry rules do not reflect such a preference;
rather, they are justified because of the bottleneck power which cable systems
possess and the possibility that such power may be used to undermine the
economic viability of broadcast stations. Id.
In response to the "disfavored treatment" argument, the majority stated that the
First Amendment does not require the application of strict scrutiny to any speech
regulation that applies to one rather than all communications media. Id. at 2468.
Where the laws are justified by special characteristics of the communications
medium, strict scrutiny is unwarranted. Id. In Turner, the Court reasoned that the
bottleneck power possessed by cable operators and the economic dangers that its
exercise poses to broadcasters provided the justification for the provisions. Id
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The five member Turner majority also distinguished between the
First Amendment rights of cable system operators and newspaper
publishers.' Cable television operators, by virtue of the
technology, possess bottleneck or gatekeeper control over subscrib-
er access to other speakers.'76 Consequently, First Amendment
regulation of cable television requires a less stringent standard than
that applied to newspapers."
While the Court did not address the potential distinctions or
similarities between telephony and cable, it may have provided
some guidance when it stated: "[t]he First Amendment's command
that government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable
the government from taking steps to ensure that private interests
not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of
communication, the free flow of information and ideas."'78
However, the ultimate impact of Turner on cable network
owners' First Amendment status is somewhat uncertain for at least
two reasons. First, the composition of the Supreme Court has
changed. Justice Harry Blackmun who aligned himself with the
majority, has subsequently retired. It is unclear how his successor,
Justice Stephen Breyer, would rule on the probative quality of the
government's evidence of economic harm, or the basic constitu-
tionality of the must-carry rules themselves' 79 Thus, while
majorities in both the district court and Supreme Court concluded
that the must-carry rules are content-neutral and the government's
interests are compelling, 8 a new majority of the Supreme Court
175. Id. at 2466.
176. Id
177. Id. By comparison, newspaper publishers cannot obstruct or prevent
reader access to other publications because they do not control the distribution of
other publications. Id
178. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). For broadcast industry reaction to this portion of the decision
see Halonen, supra note 12, at 3-4 (stating that the final decision will protect
broadcasters against wired networks with regards to new information technology).
179. See Halonen, supra note 12, at 3.
180. The district court in Turner concluded that to the extent the First
Amendment is implicated at all by the must-carry rules, it is a mere byproduct of
the fact that cable operators transmit video signals having no other function than
the communication of information. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 40. As such, the
must-carry provisions are, in the court's mind, "unrelated ... to the content of
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 61 1995
62 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
could conclude otherwise."' Justice O'Connor, like Judge
Williams below, concluded that Congress justified the must-carry
rules on its desire to assure the continued availability of local news
and public affairs, as well as educational programming by broadcasters."
any messages these embattled cable operators, broadcasters, and programmers
have in contemplation to deliver." Id.
And, to the extent that Congress may nevertheless be said to have authored
content-related provisions, the relationship between the provisions and content is
negligible, and is based at most on an assumption that broadcasters have as much
to say of interest or value as cable operators. Id. at 44. Furthermore, diversity
is better served by having both available to the public on cable facilities. Id
Not surprisingly, the Senate stated that the signal carriage provisions are "not
at all based on the content of [the broadcast] signals, but instead ... counterbal-
ance cable systems' commercial or economic incentives to exclude... [broadcast]
signals." S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1189. The Senate made only an oblique reference to the
relevance of the First Amendment to cable operator speech rights, stating that:
"[tihe First Amendment also supports government regulations intended to promote
diversity of voices, even if some incidental loss of editorial discretion results."
Id
181. Doug Halonen asserts that the conclusion that the must-carry rules pass
constitutional muster may be in jeopardy. The composition of the Court has
changed with Justice Blackmun's retirement and Justice Breyer's succession.
Halonen, supra note 12, at 3. Consequently, there is no majority for much of the
Turner opinion as currently written. If the case returns to the Court subsequent
to a full hearing in the district court, it is impossible to know with any certainty
how Justice Breyer would decide. Moreover, while it is unclear what further
evidence the parties will submit in the district court, it is likely that a future
Supreme Court will have new information before it. Thus, there are opportunities
for a new majority to emerge.
182. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 62. The Supreme Court also reached this
conclusion. Justice O'Connor, in her dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia
and Thomas, concluded that Congress' reasons for adopting the rules certainly
made significant reference to the content of information to be provided by
broadcasters. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2476-77. As such, strict scrutiny is required
even where the government's goals may be laudable. Justice O'Connor wrote:
[pIreferences for diversity of viewpoints, for localism, for educational
programming, and for news and public affairs all make reference to
content.... The controversial judgment at the heart of the statute is...
that broadcasters should be preferred over cable programmers.. . . [Tihe
findings ... represent Congress' reasons for adopting this preference;
... these reasons rest in part on the content of broadcasters' speech.
Id. at 2477-78.
The dissent continued, "[it may well be that Congress also had other, content-
neutral, purposes in mind when enacting the statute. But we have never held that
the presence of a permissible justification lessens the impropriety of relying in
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part on an impermissible justification." Id. at 2478.
Judge Williams' dissent in the district court opinion also took considerable
exception to the impact of the must-carry rules on cable operators and program-
mers. According to Judge Williams, the must-carry rules impose a "burden...
on one set of speakers for the direct and explicit advantage of a limited class of
their competitors - a class whose programming must, as a matter of law, include
content of a type specified by the government." Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 60.
The Supreme Court majority's conclusion that the must-carry rules are
unrelated to the content of the messages that the respective broadcasters and cable
casters carry is questionable. It ignores a major thrust of congressional and FCC
broadcast policy stretching back more than 30 years.
The existence, quality and quantity of bona fide licensee- provided local news
and public affairs programming has been a major broadcast regulatory issue
almost from the inception of the service. Licensee provision of news and public
affairs programming has affected its chances of receiving an initial grant of a
license or a renewal of an existing license. See In re Formulation of Rules and
Policies Relating to the Reneiwal of Broadcast Licenses, 44 F.C.C.2d 405 (1973).
Such programming has figured prominently in FCC determinations of what
constituted balanced programming under previous enforcement of the Fairness
Doctrine. See In re The Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine
and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691
(1976) (recognizing that coverage of public issues justifies regulation and is
essential to balanced programming).
Definitions of what constitutes acceptable news and public affairs programming,
including public oversight and agency enforcement, have evolved throughout the
history of broadcast regulation from the 1940's through successful deregulatory
efforts in the 1980s. See generally In re The Revision of Programming and
Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log
Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984)
(further deregulating the system by abandoning routine programming reviews,
levels of commercialization, and formal ascertainment practice of TV licenses in
uncontested renewal context); In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules
Concerning Program Definitions for Commercial Broadcast Stations by Adding
a New Program Type, 'Community Services' Program & Expanding the 'Public
Affairs' Program Category & Other Related Matters, 88 F.C.C.2d 1188 (1982)
(refusing to adopt new programming category which could include religious
programming under the guise of "public interest"); In re Deregulation of Radio,
84 F.C.C.2d 968, 988 (1981) (eliminating non-entertainment program guidelines;
ascertainment primers, commercial guidelines and program logging requirements);
In re Amendment of the Primers on Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Commercial Broadcast Renewal Applicants & Noncommercial Educational
Broadcast Applicants, Permitees and Licensees, 76 F.C.C.2d 401 (1980)
(amending ascertainment requirements by requiring non-listed checklist categories
to come forward to determine if their element is significant); In re Petition for
Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Maintain Certain Program Records,
43 F.C.C.2d 680 (1973) (holding that TV program logs should be made public
under certain circumstances); In re Primer on Ascertainment of Community
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Should the new sitting justice come to the same conclusion when
and if the case comes before the Supreme Court again, a new
majority could hold that Congress' reasons for adopting the must-
carry rules rest in part on the content of broadcasters' speech and
therefore, are impermissible.'"
Second, upon remand, evidence of economic harm may prove
insufficient to establish a sufficient threat to the government's
interest in the retention of viable broadcast stations!'" Thus, it
Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971) (clarifying guidelines
for ascertainment of community problems requirement). Finally, the potential
impact of competitive market entry on the provision of news and public affairs
programming has served as the linchpin for congressional, judicial and administra-
tive regulation of market competition. See In re Policies Regarding Detrimental
Effects of Proposed New Broadcast Stations on Existing Stations, 3 F.C.C.R. 638
(1987) (eliminating policies which address "econoinic injury" to existing broadcast
stations).
183. Both dissenting opinions assert that strict scrutiny is triggered by the
rules' impact. First, the must-carry rules mandate speech which the cable
operators may not otherwise make and prohibit cable operators from programming
a portion of their channels as they might otherwise have done. See Turner, 114
S. Ct. at 2479; Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 59. Second, the rules do so in a manner
which directly burdens the cable operators' exercise of editorial control and
speech. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2479; Turner, 819 F. Supp. 59-60. As a conse-
quence of the cable operators' loss of control over their channels of transmission,
they suffer a direct and palpable diminution of speech.
However, the dissenting opinions diverge after agreeing that the rules' impact
triggered strict scrutiny. Justice O'Connor concluded that the government's
interests were not sufficiently compelling to justify content-based speech restric-
tions. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2478. Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor does not
state what would constitute such a compelling interest. On the other hand, Judge
Williams concluded that while the government's interest in diversity was
sufficiently compelling, its means of achieving that goal was not sufficiently
narrowly tailored. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 61-62. First, there was insufficient
proof that requiring carriage of broadcasters will increase diversity. Id. Second,
there were less burdensome alternatives, such as the leased access channel
provision which could accomplish Congress' purpose. Id. While unwilling to
concede that the government showed a compelling interest, Justice O'Connor also
concluded that the rules were insufficiently tailored to achieve the government's
stated goals. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2479.
184. The district court's dissent acknowledged as compelling the government's
goal of assuring access to television for Americans financially disinclined or
incapable of subscribing to cable as well as Americans who remain geographically
remote from areas where broadcasting is offered. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 62.
However, the available evidence did not support the congressional finding that
broadcasting is economically threatened by cable. Id. Upon review of the
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proffered evidence, the dissent concluded that:
the legislative findings do not support the inferences needed to sustain
must-carry... (1) there is no finding of any present or imminent harm;
(2) the evidence of some dropping of broadcast channels in itself fails
to show any widespread problem; (3) the proliferation of local broadcast
stations since the end of the FCC's must-carry rules undermines, any
inference of a problem; (4) the findings as to structure and incentives,
taken together with the evidence of cable's dependence on broadcasting,
fail to raise the concern beyond the level of speculation; and (5) even
if the hazard were perceptible, the record does not address the less
intrusive alternatives.
Id at 65.
Moreover, Congress' efforts to compile evidence of broadcasting's economic
demise prove no more effective than prior efforts by the FCC and broadcasters.
The must-carry question is not the first instance in which economic harm to
existing broadcast stations has been raised against new competitors. See In re
Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broadcast Stations on
Existing Stations, 3 F.C.C.R. 638, 638 (1987). In the economic injury to
broadcasting cases, the courts and FCC have concluded that an existing
broadcaster could prevent the entry of a new broadcast competitor by pleading
economic harm when its allegations of economic injury were supported by proof
of a significant loss in news and public affairs programming occasioned by a loss
of advertising revenues. Id It would also have to establish that this loss in news
and public affairs programming would not be alleviated by the new entrant. Id
After years of litigation before it, the FCC concluded that no broadcaster had been
able to successfully meet the public interest burden. See id. (abolishing the
Carroll doctrine and the UHF impact policy which allowed this). The consistent
inability of broadcasters to meet the requisite burden of proof to establish an
actionable economic detriment led to the abolition of the economic injury
objection in comparative proceedings. Id. at 63940. The FCC, in abolishing the
objection, stated that-
By this action, the Commission abolishes certain policies that address
the issue of economic injury to existing broadcast stations. Our
decision is based on our experience in implementing these policies and
the intervening growth of the electronic media which lead us to
conclude that the public interest is no longer served by their retention.
Id. at 638.
The FCC also stated that their "review of more than 80 cases .. . indicate[d]
that, although parties may have routinely pleaded ... [economic injury issues],
they have been unable to demonstrate sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of
harm that would result in a net loss of service to the public." Id. at 639-40. It
continued:
We also conclude that the underlying premise of the Carroll doctrine,
the theory of ruinous competition, i.e., that increased competition in
broadcasting can be destructive to the public interest, is not valid in the
broadcast field. The court, in Carroll, conceded that "private economic
injury is by no means always, or even usually, reflected in public
1995]
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is possible that the rules may be overturned on the grounds set
forth by the dissent or the majority of the Supreme Court in
Turner."'5
2. The Precarious Constitutionality of Must-Carry
The majority's conclusion that the must-carry rules are unrelated
to the content of the messages that the respective broadcasters and
detriment. Competitors may severely injure each other to the great
benefit of the public."
Id. at 640 (quoting Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir.
1958)).
The FCC accordingly stated that it would no longer entertain claims of Carroll
injury. Id. at 641. In reaching its conclusion, the FCC also cited congressional
determinations that pleadings of economic injury would be insufficient to preclude
competitive market entry. In re Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects of
Proposed New Broadcasting Stations on Existing Stations, 2 F.C.C.R. 3134, 3135
(1987).
The FCC's conclusions regarding existing broadcasters' inability to prove
economic injury over many years in numerous licensing proceedings are
substantially similar to the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Quincy Cable Television, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434
(D.C. Cir. 1985), and those reached by the dissent in Turner. In each instance,
the evidence proffered was overly speculative. In Quincy, the Court concluded
that irrespective of the ultimate constitutionality of the rules:
the Commission had not adequately substantiated its assertion that a
substantial governmental interest existed .... [E]ven accepting the view
that the preservation of free local television was an important regulatory
goal ... the problem the sweeping must-carry rules purported to
prevent - the destruction of free, local television - was merely a
"fanciful threat" unsubstantiated by the record or by two decades of
experience with cable TV.
Century Communications v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting
Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1457).
Indeed, in its subsequent effort to justify the must-carry rules, the FCC did not
even advance an economic harm argument - a fact which the Court noted when
it deemed that argument "foreclosed by Quincy Cable TV." Id. at 299 n.4.
185. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994). The
Court remanded the case to the district court to hear further evidence because the
government had failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that broadcast
stations are in economic jeopardy and that the must-carry rules would actually
advance the government's interests by materially alleviating the economic harm.
Id Only Justice Stevens would have voted for affirmance of the district court
opinion upon which the appeal was based. Id. at 2473.
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cable operators carry is questionable. 8 6 The must-carry rules are
both content- and market-oriented regulations. They clearly affect
cable operators' programming choices. At a minimum, they
remove editorial discretion from the purview of the cable system.
The net result favors local programming offered by broadcasters
over programming chosen by cable operators. To argue otherwise
ignores a major thrust of congressional and FCC broadcast policy
that dates back more than thirty years. Moreover, Congress
articulated its concerns about the continued availability of local
programming as a partial reason for reinstating the local signal
carriage rules.'
Absent local news and public affairs programming, the difference
between the movies and entertainment programming offered on
cable, and entertainment programming offered on broadcast
stations, is negligible because cable operators still voluntarily carry
most broadcast stations and all network programming. Certainly,
the same types of programming are represented amply on both
distribution media. Accordingly, it is difficult to argue that the
government's goal of diversity is furthered by having the same
situation comedies, game shows, sports programs or movies aired
on different channels at different times. Is the facilitation of
viewer convenience in watching a particular program the diversity
that the government seeks to protect with must-carry legislation?
Again, the inevitable conclusion is that the rules are indeed
content-based. The fact that there is little distinction between
broadcast and cable television programming fare outside of local
news and public affairs supports the conclusion that Congress was
motivated in part by concerns about content. Congressional
statements and the history of broadcast regulation confirm this view
as well. The gross similarity between broadcasting programming
186. The majority also concluded that the government's regulation of the
programming content of broadcasting is minimal. Therefore, a conclusion that
Congress sought to exercise control over what programming viewers see on cable
by requiring the carriage of broadcast stations "is little more than speculation."
Id
187. See H. REP. No. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1238-39; 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§ 2(a)(9)-(13), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (1992).
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and cable programming undermines the assertion that the rules are
necessary to achieve enhanced diversity.
The rules are also clearly economic. Given some cable
operators' tendencies to favor affiliated programmers over non-
affiliated ones and to move broadcast signals around or drop them
from system offerings (albeit rarely), Congress might reasonably
conclude that, at some future time, cable operators could decide to
discontinue carriage of most broadcast stations. This could happen
if the cable operators were able to deal directly with the current
broadcast networks and other independent programmers for
programming, thereby bypassing the affiliates and independent
stations altogether. It could also happen if cable operators have
programming from their affiliates which conflicts with that offered
by broadcasters. The problem is that the demise is not imminent.
Indeed, it has not been a threat over the past two decades despite
the phenomenal change in the video distribution industry.
Moreover, the impact on the broadcast market of cable has not
been separated from the impact of other phenomena, such as the
increase in multiple ownership limits and the current recession or
FCC facilitation of new technologies competing with broadcasting.
In a representative democracy, access to information is a critical
necessity." V While there are significant drawbacks to relying on
advertising subsidies to support news and public affairs program-
ming,"' it is clear that giving access to these programs on the
basis of the ability to generate advertising revenues would
exacerbate the problem.'
188. 1992 Cable Act, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. at 1460 (1992).
189. Reliance on advertising subsidies skews presentation of information
consistent with the preferences of those whom advertisers wish to reach. To the
extent that some members of the audience are more desirable than others, less
desirable audiences receive less service. Paul Farhi, Minority Broadcasters Fault
Rating Firms' Survey Results: Owners Say Errors Discourage Advertisers,
WASH. PosT, July 18, 1989, at Cl.
190. Advertisers' assessments of the desirability of certain consumer groups
often precludes the presentation of perspectives espoused by those which
advertisers do not seek to reach. However, these individuals still receive general
information about items of presumed public and political importance. Establishing
the ability to pay as the price of access not only assures that certain perspectives
will not be represented, but may preclude access to general information as well.
HeinOnline  -- 21 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 68 1995
MULTI-MEDIA CHIMERA
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to ascertain with some precision
the manner and extent to which advertiser-subsidized local news
and public affairs programming would suffer in the absence of
must-carry rules for broadcast stations. Judicial and regulatory
precedent exist and sets forth the manner in which such an inquiry
might be made. 9' The stringent requirements of the inquiry,
however, do not facilitate a finding of economic harm.
According to Judge Williams' dissent in Turner,'92 the evi-
dence presented by broadcasters and the FCC in Quincy Cable
Television, Inc. v. FCC'93 did demonstrate a claim of economic
harm to broadcasters." Judge Williams further argued that the
evidence relied on by Congress in the Turner district court case did
not support a conclusion of imminent harm.195  While there is
some support for Congress' findings of economic harm,'96 there
is also economic evidence tending to show that whatever financial
difficulties broadcasters currently suffer are a function of the FCC's
pro-competitive policies which increased the number of broadcast
and new technology competitors.' 97  Further, the continuing
191. See WLVA, Inc. v. FCC, 459 F.2d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Carroll
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
192. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 57 (D.D.C.
1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (Williams, J, dissenting).
193. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
194. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 63.
195. Id at 65. However, the OPP report sets forth findings supporting
conclusions that the broadcast industry will face long term erosion in market
power. Robert M. Pepper, Through the Looking Glass: Integrated Broadland
Networks, Regulatory Policy and Institutional Change, OFFICE OF PLANS &
POLICY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Nov. 1988.
196. Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 63.
197. See Robert M. Pepper, supra note 195, at 23 n.42; David Kelly, FCC
Downbeats on Broadcasting, HOLLYWOOD REP., June 28, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Entert Library, THR File; Lower Quality Programming; FCC Staff Paper
Calls For Less Broadcast TVRegulation, COMM. DAILY, June 27, 1991, available
in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File; Right On Target; Reaction Quick On FCC
Study of TV Future, COMM. DAILY, June 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEWS
Library, ASAPII File; Patrick J. Sheridan, FCC Report Concedes TV's to Cable:
Federal Communications Commission Office of Plans and Policy, BROADCASTING,
July 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Entert Library, BRCAST File; Patrick J.
Sheridan, Technological Boom May Be Broadcast TV Bust: Federal Communica-
tions Report, BROADCASTING, July 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, Entert Library,
BRCAST File.
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economic recession contemporaneous with the study, caused a
significant drop in available advertiser revenues. '98 In sum, the
evidence of economic harm is, at best, inconclusive.
Moreover, even if the arguments of economic harm were
compelling, the government has less intrusive alternative means
available to assure the continued viability of over-the-air broadcast-
ing.1"  There are other methods of enhancing broadcasters'
ability to compete as multi-channel providers.2" These include:
relaxing cross-ownership restrictions between broadcasters and
newer spectrum technologies such as multichannel, multipoint
distribution systems (MMDS), instructional television fixed services
(ITFS), operational fixed services (OFS) and Personal Communica-
tions Services (PCS); further relaxation of local and regional
broadcast multiple ownership rules; expedited facilitation of multi-
channel provider/carrier entry into the video distribution market,
including telephone companies,2"' direct broadcast satellites2"
and multi-channel wave service access.2" All of the foregoing
would increase the number of channels available to broadcasters.
Introduction of DBS or another multi-channel provider such as
local telephone companies would have a positive affect on diversity
while providing increased economic viability for broadcasters.
Another alternative would be to facilitate the development of a
switched broadband carrier from whom the broadcasters could
198. See Robert M. Pepper, supra note 195, at 23 n.42; see Kelly, supra note
197; Lower Quality Programming: FCC Staff Paper Calls For Less Broadcast
TVRegulation, CoMM. DAILY, June 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ASAPH File; Sheridan, supra note 197; Barbara Ballman, Sale of WROW Will Put
Spotlight on In-Market Buys, CAPITAL Bus. DIST. REV., Jan. 25, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News Library, BUSDTL File; Michael J. Hirrel, FCC and Radio
Diversity, CHRISTIAN Sc. MONITOR, Apr. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, News
Library, TCSM File; Daniel Flamberg, Loopholes, Lifeboats or Larceny? Radio
Stations' Local Marketing Agreement, MEDIAWEEK, Feb. 17, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ASAPH File.
199. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 64-65 (D.D.C.
1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
200. Id
201. See STEPHEN B. WEINSTEIN, GETTING THE PICTURE: A GUIDE TO CATV
AND THE NEW ELECTRONIC MEDIA 138, 156 (1986).
202. Id.
203. Id.
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acquire minimum access to the market.
In sum, congressional findings that the must-carry rules would
enhance diversity and reduce the likelihood of economic harm are
insufficient and speculative. 20' Although compelling, the interests
are not achieved by the regulations and are not supported by the
adduced evidence."e Moreover, there are less restrictive alterna-
tives to achieve the government's goals.2 ' For these reasons,
there is significant justification for challenging the rules' constitu-
tionality.
2W
D. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States:2" Constraining
Network Owner Control Over Market Entry and Access
Section 7(b)(4)(B) of The Cable Act of 19922"' allows franchis-
ing authorities to require cable systems to provide public, educa-
tional and governmental (PEG) access channels.1 Section 9 of
the Act requires cable operators to make a portion of their channel
capacity available for leased access by unaffiliated program-
mers.
21 1
The Daniels court quickly rejected the cable operators' claims
that the PEG and leased access provisions were unconstitution-
al." Relying on the district court opinion in Turner,1 3 the dis-
trict court in Daniels applied an intermediate scrutiny analysis and
found that the provisions were content-neutral and served signifi-
cant government interests. 4 Consequently, the PEG and leased
204. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 63-65 (D.D.C.
1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (Williams, J., dissenting).
205. Id
206. Id
207. Id
208. 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993).
209. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
210. Id
211. Id
212. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C.
1993).
213. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993),
vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
214. The district court concluded that while the PEG and leased access
provisions "may impose some limit on the autonomy of cable operators to speak
only such speech as they would themselves pronounce, most do so only to serve
1995]
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access provisions are constitutional if they also serve significant
government interests and do not burden more speech than neces-
sary to further those interests." 5 The court determined that the
PEG access provisions enhance market diversity by affording an
opportunity for less popular speakers to gain access to cable's
pervasive transmission technology and audiences.1 6 The court
then concluded that the leased access. rules also enhance market
diversity by precluding cable operators from favoring affiliated
programmers over non-affiliated programmers. 17  Thus, the
government interest in promoting a diversity of information is
achieved.2" Further, the access provisions are narrowly tailored
and burden speech no more than necessary.2"9
Unlike the must-carry provisions, the leased access and PEG
provisions can more readily be categorized as content-neutral.2'
While other classes of speakers (non-affiliated commercial
programmers as well as residents, educational institutions and
governments of the service area) are afforded access, no particular
form of programming or viewpoint has historically been associated
with such speakers. 22' Thus, once the provisions are interpreted
as furthering a government interest unrelated to a purposeful
suppression of speech by cable operators, they are deemed
constitutional if narrowly tailored to serve the government inter-
ests.2=
E. The Constitutional Access Paradigm Circa 1994
regulatory goals unrelated to content." 835 F. Supp. at 4-5 (citing Turner
Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 42).
215. Daniels, 835 F. Supp. at 4-5.
216. id
217. Id at 7.
218. Id
219. The court relied on the fact that PEG channel usage was negotiable
between the franchisor and franchisee and that leased access channels were
assigned on a proportional basis with an absolute limit on the number of channels
which a cable operator could be required to provide. Id. at 7.
220. Id
221. Id
222. Id at 4-5.
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1. Network Owner Access
It is possible to view C&P,2n Turner" and Daniels2' as
addressing different aspects of the multi-media "chimera."
Practically speaking, the cross-ownership requirement restricting
access to one's network is not very different from the cable access
requirement precluding use of one's network to allow others access.
The difference is one of degree not of kind.
The market access regulations of telephone companies and of the
cable industry exist on a continuum. At one end, local telephone
companies cannot enter the market or access its facilities and are
not permitted to engage in video speech on its own facilities. On
the other hand, cable companies are allowed access and can
exercise speech rights, but are required to forbear from such
exercise on a portion of their channel capacity.' In both
instances, the requirement to forbear is justified as a content-neutral
means of achieving diversity given the bottleneck control the
telephone companies and cable networks currently enjoy. Howev-
er, if the cable industry is afforded substantial access and speech
rights and required to free up a certain amount of their capacity, it
is inequitable to require telephone companies to do more.*2
223. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D.
Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
224. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993),
vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
225. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993).
226. Id
227. A search for technical or economic grounds supporting a distinction
between local telephone and cable networks proves relatively fruitless. Are the
attempts to monopolize distinguishable as a matter of degree? For cable
operators, vertical integration of the programming and distribution functions create
conflicts of interest vis-a-vis other programmers. For telephone companies,
vertical integration of the programming and distribution functions are expected to
create the same conflicts.
While their architectures are different, the existence of substantial capacity on
both systems would militate against making the distinction on the basis of
architecture. Regardless of whether the non-affiliated speaker acquires access to
cable's point to multi-point network or the telephone company's switched
interactive system, arguably the more capacity the potential network provider
possesses, the less intrusive the requirement of third party access becomes.
Moreover, as the network technologies merge, it is likely that cable operators may
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The cross-ownership prohibition that was struck down in C&P
prohibited the carrier from accessing its local network for the
purpose of engaging in video speech.2' In Turner, the cable
operators argued and the Supreme Court agreed that the must-carry
rules require them to forbear from engaging in access to a portion
of their networks in order to provide third party access.2' The
same assessment applies to the PEG and leased access channels
addressed in Daniels. ° In sum, all of the provisions require the
network owner to forbear from using some portion of its network
capacity to engage in video speech.
Comparing C&P to Turner, it may be argued that the require-
ment to forbear from any access is more egregious than the
requirement to forbear from a portion of one's network, because
unlike the cable operator, a telephone company may not engage in
access or speech at all.
C&P and US West, Inc. v. United States23 remedy this
inequity. Local telephone companies may not be prohibited from
engaging in protected speech.232 Although the government has a
compelling interest in diversity, the flat ban is counterproductive
and burdens more speech than necessary.233
2. Non-Affiliated Programmer Access
While courts have now ruled that the government may not
preclude the local telephone network owner from gaining access to
its network to engage in video speech, m two courts have ruled
that the government may require the cable network owner to
provide switched services and telephone networks may provide point to multi-
point video services.
228. Daniels, 835 F. Supp. at 10.
229. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
230. Daniels, 835 F. Supp. at 7.
231. 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994), afftd, No. 94-35775, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 39121 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1995).
232. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 931
(E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
233. Id
234. C&P, 830 F. Supp. 909; US West, 855 F. Supp. 1184; BellSouth Corp.,
868 F. Supp. 1335.
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provide access to non-affiliated programmers and users. 5  In
particular, where the cable network owner possesses bottleneck
control over access to the video market, requirements to provide
access to speakers not associated or identified with particular
content or speech will survive constitutional challenge. 6
3. Access to Network Programming Functionalities
Today, local telephone networks, because of greater distributed
software intelligence, provide opportunities to alter the composition
and flow of information. One significant issue left unresolved
because of failed congressional efforts to revise communications
legislation is whether access to the service environment housing the
programming functionalities will be shared between the network
owner, information providers and users. Cable networks incorpo-
rating many of the same network functionalities may provide
similar opportunities. In the absence of legislative guidance, how
would a regulatory decision requiring the network owner to provide
access to the service creation environment fare on constitutional
grounds? Is this ability to reconfigure the network part of the
constellation of editorial functions or is the exercise of such
flexibility constitute a content-neutral exercise?
Assuming the exercise of programming flexibility affects
electronic speech, would regulatory provisions requiring shared
control be deemed constitutional? To answer these questions,
applications of the rational basis test is inappropriate. There is no
technical interference or spectrum-based scarcity, and economic
scarcity does not provide sufficient justification for implementing
the rationality standard.237 However, strict scrutiny does not seem
appropriate either. A provision requiring shared access to the
235. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994); Daniels
Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 835 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1993). This presumes that
the requirement is content-neutral, is justified by compelling interests, and is
tailored to achieve the interests without burdening more speech than is necessary.
236. For reasons previously stated, leased and PEG channels are likely to pass
constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny. See discussion supra parts II.C
and 119.D.
237. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 918-
19 (E.D. Va. 1993), aft'd, 42 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
19951
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service creation environment would appear to be content-neu-
tral.238 There is no particular class of speakers identifiable on the
basis of the content of their speech, which would trigger a strict
scrutiny analysis. Speakers who benefit are all speakers who do
not own transmission facilities; this a technical distinction.239
There is no particular type, format or content of speech which is
preferred over another."8 To the extent that network technology
allows for interactive, multi-media communication, all types,
formats and content combinations would be allowed.241 Finally,
the requirement to share access to programming functionalities
would not be triggered by the network owners' speech. Rather,
consistent with FCC rationale, the possession of bottleneck control
over essential facilities and extensive capacity trigger the require-
ment.
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the regulation must be content-
neutral and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest. 1 2 This regualtion should be deemed narrowly tailored,
because the networks in question possess growing capacity and
access is shared with the network owner. Finally, the requirement
to provide shared access to programming functionalities would
serve the government's interest in promoting economic competi-
tion, and diversity of speakers and information sources. Opportu-
nities for competition and electronic speech would arise if
enhanced opportunities were provided for network owners,
information providers and users to create, manipulate and control
the composition and flow of information.
IV. INDECENT SPEECH AND REGULATION BY PRIVATE
SURROGATE
Another area of recent government activity resulting in the
articulation of electronic speech rights centers on attempts to limit
the access of children and non-consenting adults to indecent
238. Id. at 922-26.
239. Id
240. Id at 924.
241. Id at 923-24.
242. C&P, 830 F. Supp. at 917.
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information regarding sex via broadcasting, cable or telephone.
In related legislation and resulting litigation, a number of issues
have arisen.
The primary issue is the extent to which the government may
constitutionally prohibit or restrict consenting-adult-user access to
obscene or indecent telephonic communication in an effort to limit
access by non-consenting adults and children.' The secondary
issue is where tort liability will fall. The locus of liability can
significantly affect the exercise of control over the flow of
information.245
243. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, rev'g, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978)
(holding that the FCC may constitutionally limit the time of day during which
indecent speech may be broadcast); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932
F.2d 1504 (DC. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992) (holding the
FCC's ban on broadcast of all indecent material unconstitutional). See also In re
Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 998 (1993) (first report and order) (implementing Section
IV of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
which allows cable operators to prohibit indecent programming on commercially
leased access channels); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
(establishing liability and exempting procedures for the transmission of
pornographic voice communication); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1989) (establishing liability
and exempting procedures for the transmission of pornographic voice communica-
tion).
244. Generally, the government possesses the constitutional authority to
regulate indecent speech within certain parameters. See FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504
(D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992); Sable Communications,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
245. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 131 (Scalia, J., concurring). In
concurring with the majority's decision to overturn Congress' ban on indecent
telephone speech, Justice Scalia stated that "while we hold the Constitution
prevents Congress from banning indecent speech in this fashion, we do not hold
that the Constitution requires public utilities to carry it." Id. at 133. This solution
has met with criticism, however. "The thinking behind the shifting of responsi-
bility for regulating information content from entities subject to the First
Amendment to private-sector actors who are not is understandable. But the short-
term benefits are exceeded by the costs of allowing monopoly LECs the power
to determine freely, what is and what is not allowed on the network." Susan J.
Drucker & Gary Gumpert, Desexualization of the Telephone, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19,
1990, (Outside Council Section) at 1 (questioning the efficacy of the ban); see
also Roopali Mukh, Regulation of 976 Services and Dial-A-Porn: Implications for
the Intelligent Network, TELECoMM. POL'Y, Apr. 1991, at 151, 162.
For a discussion on cable network owner control of indecent speech, see Bruce
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In broadcast regulation, because the licensee has editorial control
over the content of communication, imposing liability on the
network provider is logical and practical. However, given the
unique requirements of leased and public access channels, imposing
liability and responsibility on the cable operator is problematic.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
refused to uphold an FCC requirement that cable operators exercise
control over the presentation of obscene programming on access
channels.7 The court found that the FCC's requirement was a
veiled attempt to mandate cable operators to engage in prior
restraint of access channel programmers.f 7 Accordingly, the
attempt "to transfer to cable operators the very censorship power
statutorily forbidden to the Commission in section 326 of the act
.[was] ill founded.""4
Curiously, Congress and the FCC recently determined that cable
operators should be encouraged to monitor access programming to
preclude the transmission of indecent material. 249 Also, where
cable operators allow indecent programming on leased access
channels, they must carry it on separate channels and only allow
subscribers to view such programming subsequent to a written
request.2" Congress also directed the FCC to promulgate
regulations allowing cable operators to prohibit programming which
was deemed obscene, constituted sexually explicit conduct, or
solicited or promoted unlawful conduct."5 ' The statute also
removed cable operators' immunity from state prosecution for
obscenity." 2 Thus, through the adoption of the Act, Congress
reinvested in cable operators editorial control over the content of
information transmitted on access channels. By imposing liability
Fein, Cable Discretion and the First Amendment, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1992, at
G1 (citing Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 827
F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988).
246. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1062 (8th Cir. 1978), affd,
440 U.S. 689 (1979).
247. Id at 1052.
248. Id. at 1059.
249. Pub. L. No. 102-385, §§ 10(a),(c), 106 Stat. 1486 (1992).
250. Id § 10(b).
251. Id § 10(c).
252. Id § 10(d).
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and removing the operators' immunity from prosecution, Congress
encouraged operators to assert control over obscene information.
The statute and the FCC's implementing regulations regarding
government-initiated cable operator bans of indecent programming
on access channels were challenged and subsequently declared
unconstitutional. The court in Alliance for Community Media v.
FCC 3 held that "not only does the First Amendment prohibit the
government from banning all indecent speech from access
channels, it also prevents the government from deputizing cable
operators with the power to effect such a ban."2"  Although the
253. 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated upon the granting of request for
reh'g en banc, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
254. Alliance, 10 F.3d at 815. The court did not rule on the blocking
provision. See In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 998 (1993) (first report and
order) (implementing Section IV of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, which allows cable operators to prohibit indecent
programming on commercially leased access channels).
In Alliance, the circuit court considered, among other issues, the constitutional-
ity of the FCC regulations requiring cable operators to prohibit or segregate any
programming, on their leased access channels they believe to be indecent, and
prohibit obscene or indecent programming as well as programming which solicits
unlawful conduct. Although the government argued that the cable operators
operating under the regulations are not state actors, the court concluded that the
statute encourages the operators to ban indecent speech. Consequently, the
operators' compelled action was held to be state action. Alliance, 10 F.3d at 822.
The circuit court applied the test set forth in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), to Section 10 of the 1992 Cable Act. Alliance, 10 F.3d at 820. Under
that test, the immediate objective, historical context and ultimate effect of the
cable statute were examined. The court determined that: 1) the immediate
objective of the statute was to suppress indecent information by limiting its
transmission on access channels; 2) the historical context in which the statute was
promulgated strongly supported a conclusion that the government sought to use
the statute to strip cable operators of editorial power over the content of
information on leased and public access channels and then require the cable
operator to identify and prohibit only indecent material; and 3) the statute had the
ultimate effect of encouraging a number of cable operators to ban indecent
programming from leased and access channels altogether. Id at 820-22. Based
on these findings, the court concluded that the statute's encouragement of total
denial of indecent speech by cable operators constituted impermissible state
action. Id at 822.
The court ultimately found that the ban was unconstitutional because it was not
the least restrictive means for achieving the government's goal of regulating
children's access to indecent programming. Id. at 823-24.
1995]
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decision was subsequently vacated and the case was set for
rehearing en banc,"s it is consistent with prior precedent.2"
In telephony, the responsibility for containment of indecent
speech was collectively placed on the network, information
providers and the subscriber." The information provider can
avoid liability by offering services that segregate the information
such as prepayment by credit card, use of an authorization number,
or message scrambling.' As a result, the subscriber/consumer
has the option of requesting access to such information, assuming
control over its availability and receipt.259 Notification by the
subscriber absolves the information provider and the network
provider of liability.2' Finally, the network provider can avoid
liability by declining to provide billing services or acquiring
subscriber permission to make indecent information available. 6'
The network provider is absolved of liability if it is not notified
that the transmitted information is indecent. 62 Despite the
relatively "user friendly," albeit complex compromise embodied in
the statute, courts have held that network providers are "free under
the Constitution to terminate service to dial-a-porn operators altogether '
255. Alliance, 10 F.3d 812.
256. See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1058 (8th Cir. 1978),
aff'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
257. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)-(c) (1988).
258. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(3).
259. 47 U.S.C. § 223(c)(3).
260. Id
261. Id
262. 47 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(B)(i).
263. Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 877 (9th Cir.
1991). Courts have reasoned that because telephone carriers are private companies
rather that state actors, they are not obligated by the Constitution to provide
transmission and billing services to any particular group of subscribers. Id; see
also Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d
1291 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988); Dial Info. Servs. Corp.
of N.Y. v. Thomburg, 938 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966
(1992). The reasoning in these cases follows the dicta of Justice Scalia in Sable
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring).
In each of the appellate cases, the issues concerned messages for which the
telephone companies collected fees on behalf of the information provider. The
information providers were allowed to provide messages for which the telephone
companies did not provide billing services. However, the difficulties associated
with collections without the assistance of the phone companies rendered the
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The cable indecency and telephone dial-a-porn precedents enable
the government to pursue a policy which imposes liability for the
content of information on the network provider. By making the
network provider responsible for the speech of others, the govern-
ment undermines efforts to expand access to networks and
opportunities for speech. The government suppresses unwanted or
problematic speech because often simple self-preservation will
dictate that the network provider curtail all "offensive speech" to
avoid liability. Both cable and telephone network providers have
resorted to this strategy.
Moreover, to declare network providers as private actors and
speakers responsible for the carriage of public information
encourages and justifies private censorship of public speech. There
is also significant potential for programmers and users to lose
speech opportunities when carriers possess bottleneck control over
the flow of information into the homes and businesses of the
American public. Not only may cable and telephone network
providers decide to eschew carriage to avoid liability, they may
also do so to preclude competition or to suppress speech with
which they disagree.
It seems clear that the greater the control an entity exercises over
information providers' businesses marginal at best. The carriers' provision of
billing services was voluntary rather than required by law.
In Information Providers, the petitioners argued that FCC regulations requiring
an individual wishing to receive "dial-a-porn" messages to notify the carrier in
writing constituted a prior restraint. The court disagreed, concluding that no prior
restraint was involved. According to the court, there was no government action
to enjoin speech, require advanced governmental approval for speech, censor or
license speech. Instead, only the telephone companies were involved and because
they are private actors, they are constitutionally free to ban dial-a-porn from their
networks and/or refuse to make available billing services to dial-a-porn
information providers. 922 F.2d at 877. Similar conclusions have been reached
in the other cases. See, e.g., Carlin Communications, 827 F.2d at 1293, 1295,
1297 n.10; Dial Info. Servs., 938 F.2d at 1543.
Professor Jerome Barron has questioned the wisdom of the circuit court
opinions. He argues that upholding the decisions of telephone common carriers
to refuse carriage or the provision of billing services to dial-a-porn providers
allows the carriers to exercise an unjustified measure of editorial control over the
content of speech transmitted over their facilities. See Jerome Barton, The Telco,
The Common Carrier Model and the First Amendment - The "Dial-A-Porn"
Precedent, 19 RuTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371, 385-91 (1993).
1995]
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speech, the greater its liability for the impact of the speech.
However, where the government artificially imposes liability as it
does when it attempts to hold cable operators responsible for the
speech of third parties on access channels or hold telephone
companies responsible for the information of third parties trans-
mitted over switched facilities, the rational relationship between
speech and responsibility is subverted. Moreover, the government,
if allowed to impose liability, succeeds in transferring to private
network providers the very censorship power it is forbidden to
exercise under the Constitution.
Ideally, technology should be fashioned so that the responsibility
for speech lies with the information providers and users. While
some may argue that this arrangement does not promote the
maximum flow of information, it does place the burden for the
information's impact on its beneficiaries. Moreover, it exposes
government efforts to suppress speech rather than permitting them
to hide behind a veil of alleged private action.
CONCLUSIONS
In light of the failure of recent congressional efforts to revise the
1992 Cable Act, 64 and the significant likelihood that current
efforts may fail as well, the current judicial resolution of challenges
to the telephone-cable cross ownership ban, must-carry, leased
access and PEG provisions merits attention. As previously
mentioned, the decisions address the constitutionality of speech
regulation in the two industries from which much of the broadband
infrastructure is likely to- emerge, regardless of the architecture
which ultimately prevails.265
Collectively, the decisions establish the following tentative
guidelines. First, the government may not prohibit network owners
264. See Senate Drops Telecom Reform, CHI. SUN-T IES, Sept.'23, 1994, at
4; Telecommunications Reform Dies in the Senate, PR NEWSWiRE, Sept. 23, 1994;
Rex Nutting, Communications Bill Dies, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Sept. 23, 1994;
Congress Won't Overhaul Telecom Law This Year, REuTERS WORLD SERVICE,
Sept. 23, 1994.
265. See Yokell, supra note 91; Joseph S. Kraemer, Local Competition;
Changing Ground Rules for Network Access, Bus. COMm. REv., Sept. 1994, at
S4.
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(a specific class of speakers) from engaging in protected speech by
prohibiting entry into the video marketplace.' Although they
reflect compelling government interests, such prohibitions are
counterproductive and burden more speech than necessary.
Second, the government may require network owners controlling
bottleneck facilities to provide access to unaffiliated programmers
or information providers as well as users, provided that the
requirement is content-neutral, achieves a compelling government
interest and burdens no more speech than necessary.
A. Network Owner Access to the Video Marketplace
As recently decided by different federal courts, government
regulations precluding telephone company use of their network for
video speech will be revised to accommodate network owner
access and control. However, the scope of the new access control
is tentative and ill-defined. While the government may not
preclude local telephone entry into the video distribution market,
what form may that entry take? May the local telephone company
merge with the local cable company? In the alternative, may the
government require the telephone company to build an independent
cable network and operate it via a separate subsidiary?
The government is likely to opt for "separate but equal" if given
a choice between encouraging the merger of local telephone and
cable networks or requiring that they remain separate while
allowing the owners to merge technologies. Allowing a merger of
two local competitors results in a net loss of one competitor. The
loss of the only potentially powerful competitor to an entity
controlling essential facilities in the market is not likely to enhance
competition or diversity. As a practical matter, opting for separate
competitors does not prohibit network owner access; rather, it
enhances competition and maximizes market-based opportunities
266. In defining the scope of section 533(b), the FCC concluded that
multimedia graphics and information services were not video programming.
Therefore, C&P's holding applies to entry into the electronic publishing and the
information services markets. See C&P, 830 F. Supp. at 923 (quoting In re
Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781,
5882 (second report and order, recommendation to Congress, and second further
notice of proposed rulemaking)).
19951
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for speech and diversity. In addition, this option is content-neutral;
therefore, it is likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny. More-
over, it enjoys industry wide support and is the policy choice
articulated by Congress in its recent efforts to amend the 1992
Cable Act.
If the court decisions in the telephone company-cable industry
cross-ownership remain as precedent, absent the application of
cable regulations to the new telephone-cable video provider, the
scope of user access and speech rights will likely be established by
tariff and/or contract, reflecting the relative bargaining power of the
parties. As a result, in the absence of state action, small providers
and users will have access and speech rights solely at the suffer-
ance of the network owner. The specter of private censorship,
unmediated by government, could become quite apparent.
B. Non-Affiliated Programmer and User Access
May the local telephone network owner qua cable operator retain
all of its capacity for the transmission of programming provided by
its affiliated programmers? If not, must it provide free access to
all broadcasters who request it? Must the new cable system owner
comply with leased access and PEG provisions? What if the
telephone companies' version of video transmission is switched and
not multi-channel, point to multi-point? What difference does this
make and what might regulations apply?
Given the high stakes which attend telephone company entry into
the video market, government, cable television, broadcast and
public interests are likely to successfully lobby for the application
of cable access regulations to the new telco-based cable competitor.
In the event that the new competitor provides service via a point
to multi-point architecture possessing discrete channels, access will
be determined on the basis of capacity, the bargaining power of the
franchising authority and the new video provider. If the new video
provider employs a switched architecture, a platform of video
functionalities will be established. Efforts would then be made to
assure speaker beneficiaries ample, affordable access. Such efforts
would include amending the must-carry, leased and PEG access
rules to cover switched interactive video transmission architecture.
These efforts would be made regardless of whether the local
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telephone company or the local cable firm opts for a switched
architecture.
Should the must-carry, leased access and PEG rule decisions
ultimately be affirmed by the Supreme Court, opportunities for
access and speech will continue to incorporate the current statutory
delineations of leased access, public access and network owner
access, as well as their switched interactive analogues. The scope
of access and speech rights each group enjoys would continue to
be defined by statute and supported by case precedent.
Assuming C&P,20 Turner26 and Daniels269 remain as pre-
cedent, telephone and cable network speakers, unaffiliated informa-
tion providers and users would be provided outlets for speech.
Arguably, under this scenario, the focus of access and speech
policy shifts to a government-mediated inquiry into the extent and
the manner in which the owner/provider may limit or prohibit the
exercise of access and speech rights by potential and actual
users/subscribers. The First Amendment is better served when
network owners, providers and users retain access and speech
rights.
If the must-carry provisions are overturned in a subsequent
appeal, broadcasters and the forty percent of Americans who do not
have access to cable would be the immediate losers. The impact
of a reversal on the PEG and leased access provisions would be
significant as well. The loss of leased access and PEG channels
would preclude non-affiliated programmers and members of the
public having little or no money, from communicating via cable
television.
C. Electronic Schizophrenia?
Whether heralded as the coming of electronic empowerment,
chided skeptically as superhighway hype, or viewed dimly as the
ill-advised coronation of a private version of "Big Brother," the
multi-media convergence is upon the nation and we are poised at
its brink. Congress, the Clinton Administration and the FCC are
267. 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
268. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1993).
269. 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993).
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actively considering how the cable, local telephone and other media
industries may compete, merge and interconnect technically and
economically. Meanwhile, the judiciary is establishing the
constitutional limits of recent legislative initiatives to maintain
market separation and ensure access. Industry seeks to preempt the
government's regulatory efforts by proposing a spate of mergers
which would create fewer, larger and more vertically integrated
multi-media companies.
In the rush to implement, decisionmakers should step back and
consider the interrelationships between our conflicting regulatory
goals and their probable impact on the freedom of speech, a most
cherished right. In electronic media regulation, our technical,
economic and constitutional policies are at odds.
Telecommunications, computer and broadband technologies
evolve toward architectures affording greater access and speech
opportunities for larger numbers of American citizens. Switched
interactive broadband communications networks, when outfitted
with distributed intelligence and augmented by computers, could
transform each American into an electronic speaker potentially as
powerful as broadcasters and cable operators are today.
However, in its growing, often justified discomfort with
unpopular ideas, the government is privatizing the technologies and
network architectures while constitutionally justifying the place-
ment of control over access and speech activities in fewer and
more private hands. Even when constitutional policies have been
used to enhance access and speech opportunities, the government
reacts almost immediately to limit the exercise of the opportunities
that technology and the Constitution have conferred. For example,
while the government seeks to assure public and unaffiliated
programmer access to cable operators' multi-channel networks, it
imposes liability for content on the operators, thereby placing them
in an untenable situation.
In telephony, the government espouses policies of universal
service and privacy while electing to impose liability for third party
content on the network provider, as well as on the beneficiaries of
the information transaction. Meanwhile, the judiciary upholds
policies that allow network providers, upon whom ninety-three
percent of the nation relies to communicate personal and intimate
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information, to refuse carriage of information it deems indecent.
The most damaging aspects of this regulatory philosophy are
clear. First, efforts to extend meaningful access and speech rights
to the society at large are undermined. Second, by resort to private
proxy, the government effectively censors speech and accomplishes
through the network provider what the Constitution will not allow
outright Third, liability for the impact of speech is misplaced. A
regulatory philosophy which encourages government censorship
and unfairly imposes liability is not only inequitable; it is also
constitutionally suspect.
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